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BRINGING OUR CHILDREN BACK FROM THE LAND OF NOD: 
WHY THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT FORBIDS CONDEMNING 
JUVENILES TO DIE IN PRISON FOR ACCESSORIAL FELONY 
MURDER 
Mariko K. Shitama∗ 
Abstract 
Over 2,589 individuals sit in prison, where they have been condemned 
to die for crimes they committed before their eighteenth birthday. At least a 
quarter of these individuals received this sentence for accessorial felony 
murder, or a crime in which they did not kill or intend to kill the victim. 
Beginning with Roper v. Simmons in 2005 and continuing with Graham v. 
Florida in 2010, recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence has recognized 
that juveniles are fundamentally different from adults in ways that limit the 
constitutionality of imposing adult punishment on them. In June 2012, the 
Supreme Court held that sentencing juveniles to mandatory life without 
parole constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in another landmark 
ruling, Miller v. Alabama. Miller did not extend Graham’s categorical rule 
against life without parole to those convicted of homicide, including 
accessorial felony murder. However, it gives at least 2,000 individuals 
currently serving life without parole for crimes they committed as juveniles 
a chance at resentencing, and requires that the sentencer take into account 
their child status and any other mitigating circumstances surrounding their 
offense in meting out a new sentence.  
This Note focuses on juvenile life without parole and current Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence in the context of felony murder and makes two 
arguments. First, it argues that the Eighth Amendment as interpreted by 
Graham categorically prohibits sentencing those juveniles who do not kill 
or intend to kill to life without parole. Second, it argues that even without a 
categorical rule, lower courts properly applying Miller should resentence 
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INTRODUCTION 
After Cain kills his brother Abel in the Old Testament, God appears and 
tells Cain he will forever be a “fugitive and a vagabond” upon the earth.1 
Although God does not punish Cain with death, he condemns him to 
perpetual shame as an outsider in the land of Nod, never again to return to 
Eden.2 In Roper v. Simmons,3 the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for 
its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence challenging the imposition of adult 
punishment on juvenile4 offenders, and held that sentencing juveniles to 
death constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.5 However, as juveniles 
continue to be prosecuted as adults, far too many of them have been 
sentenced to a different kind of death—to live and die within the walls of 
adult prisons, forever banished from society in their own land of Nod.  
In 2011, the Supreme Court revisited the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibitions on the cruel and unusual punishment of juvenile offenders in 
Graham v. Florida,6 where the defendant, Terrence Graham, was 
sentenced to life without parole for his participation in a home-invasion 
robbery when he was sixteen.7 The Court reversed Graham’s sentence and 
held that sentencing juveniles to life without the possibility of parole for a 
nonhomicide offense is unconstitutional.8 The Court affirmed its 
conclusion in Roper that developmental differences in juveniles make them 
categorically less culpable than adults. Specifically, it cited their lack of 
maturity and impulsiveness; limited control over their environment; 
increased vulnerability to peer pressure; and unformed character.9 The 
Court found that juveniles “cannot with reliability be classified among the 
worst offenders,” and that it is morally unacceptable “to equate the failings 
of a minor with those of an adult” because there is a greater possibility that 
a minor’s characteristic deficiencies will be reformed.” It required states to 
give juveniles convicted of nonhomicide offenses a “meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrable maturity and 
                                                                                                                     
 1. Genesis 4:12. 
 2. Genesis 4:16. 
 3. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 4. This article employs the term “juvenile” and “child” as the Supreme Court does—to refer 
to any child who was under the age of eighteen at the time of his or her offense and was tried as an 
adult. The term “adolescent” is also used interchangeably. 
 5. Roper, 543 U.S. at 573–74 (abrogating Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1988), which 
held that the death penalty could be imposed on juvenile offenders between the ages of sixteen and 
seventeen). The Eighth Amendment, which provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted,” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII, is 
made applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 560. 
 6. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).  
 7. Id. at 2018–19. 
 8. Id. at 2034.  
 9. Id. at 2026 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570). 
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rehabilitation.”10  
Despite Roper and Graham,11 and a proliferation of nueroscientific 
evidence that juveniles have an extraordinary capacity for change and 
rehabilitation,12 there are an estimated 2,589 individuals in the United 
States who were tried as adults and are now serving life without parole for 
crimes they committed before their eighteenth birthday.13 The lives of most 
of these children before they went to prison were filled with trauma.14 They 
grew up in extremely poor, violent neighborhoods.15 They suffered abuse, 
neglect, brutality, and a dire lack of adult and familial support,16 and as 
juveniles, they lacked the ability to remove themselves from this trauma.17 
Of course, the devastating backgrounds of these individuals do not justify 
the harm they inflicted when they committed their crimes. But their 
haunting profiles demand an honest assessment of whether a desire for 
retribution should outweigh any commitment to their rehabilitation and 
                                                                                                                     
 10. Id. at 2030.  
 11. Id. at 2026–27. 
 12. See, e.g., Charles Geier & Beatriz Luna, The Maturation of Incentive Processing and 
Cognitive Control, 93 PHARMACOLOGY, BIOCHEMISTRY & BEHAV. 212, 218 (2009) (concluding that 
the lack of cognitive development in adolescents leading to risk taking and impulsive behavior is 
“best . . . understood as an emergent property of a still-maturing brain”). 
 13. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STATE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTIMATED 2,589 JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
SERVING LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE (2009), [hereinafter JUVENILES SERVING LWOP], available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/updatedJLWOP10.09.pdf. In its initial 
report, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD 
OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (2005) [hereinafter THE REST OF THEIR LIVES], available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf. Human Rights Watch 
(HRW) explained that it is difficult to get a precise number of those serving juvenile life without 
parole because individual states’ departments of corrections do not provide publicly accessible 
statistics about juvenile offenders incarcerated in adult prisons, and there is no national database 
with this information. HRW “collect[ed] [this] data . . . by requesting that it be specially 
produced . . . by each state’s corrections department. Id. Despite the difficulty in obtaining a 
concrete number, it is clear that the number of individuals serving juvenile life without parole has 
increased significantly since 2005. See id. at 1 (finding that in 2005, 2,225 children had been 
sentenced to life without parole). 
 14. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: SENTENCING 13- AND 14-YEAR-OLD 
CHILDREN TO DIE IN PRISON 15 (2007) [hereinafter CRUEL AND UNUSUAL], available at 
http://eji.org/eji/files/Cruel%20and%20Unusual%202008_0.pdf; ASHLEY NELLIS, PH.D., THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 8–13 
(2012) [hereinafter THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS].  
 15. See reports cited supra note 14.  
 16. See id. Before they were sentenced to die in prison, approximately a third of these 
children were living in public housing, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS, supra note 14, at 9; almost 
80% witnessed violence in their homes; nearly half were themselves victims of physical abuse, id. at 
10; one fifth were victims of sexual abuse; 40% were enrolled in special education classes, id. at 13; 
and more than a quarter had a parent in prison, id. at 12.  
 17. The Supreme Court in Roper explained that “[A]s legal minors, [juveniles] lack the 
freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a criminogenic setting.” 543 U.S. 551, 569 
(2005). 
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redemption. As it stands, society has sent an unequivocal message to these 
children that no matter what transformative change and growth they 
undergo, they are forever irredeemable.18 This practice represents a 
complete departure from the rehabilitative ideals that led to the creation of 
a separate juvenile justice system in this country, a system intended to 
replace punitive treatment of child offenders in light of their lessened 
culpability and great capacity for change.19 This departure is particularly 
shameful given that the United States is the only country in the world 
known to have any children serving this sentence.20 
While Graham gave the 123 individuals serving juvenile life without 
parole for nonhomicide offenses21 a second chance at redemption, it did 
nothing to alleviate the bleak futures of the rest of those serving the 
sentence. Perhaps unsurprisingly, approximately 93% of the 2,589 
juveniles tried as adults and serving life without parole were convicted of a 
homicide offense.22 More surprising is that a conservative estimate shows 
that 26% of these individuals were convicted of felony murder, or murder 
based on accessorial liability23—often in cases in which the juvenile 
participated in a robbery or burglary during which an accomplice killed the 
victim without the juvenile’s knowledge or intent.24 The child-status of 
these defendants and the circumstances of their offenses make 
                                                                                                                     
 18. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 82.  
 19. See infra Sections II.A–B. 
 20. Connie de la Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in Prison: 
Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983, 989 (2008) (explaining that while “ten countries 
other than the United States . . . have laws with the potential to permit” life without parole for 
juveniles, “there are no known cases where this has occurred”). The United States has been the lone 
dissenter among over 180 countries who have voted to ratify The United Nations General 
Assembly’s resolutions to abolish life without parole for juveniles. See G.A. Res. 61/146, ¶ 31(a), 
U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/146 (Dec. 19, 2006); G.A. Res. 62/141, ¶ 36(a) U.N. Doc. A/Res/62/141 (Dec. 
18, 2007); G.A. Res. 63/241, ¶ 43(a), U.N. Doc. A/Res/63/241 (Dec. 24, 2008).  
 21. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2024 (2010). 
 22. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 27. Contrary to popular assumption, an 
estimated 59% of children received life without parole for their first criminal conviction. Id. at 1. 
 23. “Felony murder” and “accessorial felony murder” are used interchangeably in this Note to 
refer to murder based on transferred intent: where an accomplice kills the victim, and the defendant 
does not himself kill or intend to kill. In these cases, the defendant’s intent to commit the 
underlying felony substitutes as his intent to kill. See infra notes 223–227 and accompanying text.  
 24. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 27. According to HRW there are roughly 673 
juveniles (26% of 2,589 total individuals) serving life without parole for felony murder, or for 
“aiding and abetting” a murder in which another person pulled the trigger. Id. In many of these 
cases, the triggerman was an older accomplice. Id.; JUVENILES SERVING LWOP, supra note 13. 
While data is not available to confirm a concrete number, more in-depth research in specific 
jurisdictions suggests that this may be a conservative estimate. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra 
note 13, at 27–28. HRW notes that in Colorado 33% of the 24 juveniles investigated by HRW were 
serving life without parole for felony murder, and in Michigan nearly half of the 146 youth 
surveyed by the ACLU in 2004 were sentenced to life without parole for felony murder, or for 
“‘aiding and abetting’ a murder in which another person pulled the trigger.” Id. 
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unconscionable such an ultimate condemnation for murders they did not 
intend or perpetrate. Although the Court in Graham reasoned in dicta that 
“a juvenile offender who did not kill or intend to kill has a twice 
diminished moral culpability” and is “categorically less deserving of the 
most serious forms of punishment,”25 the Court was not forced to address 
the issue of unintentional felony murder because no one was killed during 
the commission of Terrence Graham’s crime.26 And unfortunately, without 
a direct mandate from the high Court, lower courts have interpreted 
Graham narrowly and have refused to extend its categorical rule to 
juveniles convicted of felony murder.27  
But little more than a year after Graham, in June 2012, the Supreme 
Court issued another landmark ruling in Miller v. Alabama,28 in which it 
consolidated the cases of petitioners Evan Miller and Kuntrel Jackson29—
each convicted of homicide and sentenced to mandatory life without parole 
at the age of fourteen.30 A narrow 5–4 majority held that a mandatory 
sentence of life without parole for a juvenile convicted of any offense 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment,31 and remanded both cases for 
                                                                                                                     
 25. 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 26. See id. at 2018. 
 27. See, e.g., Bear Cloud v. State, 2012 WY 16, 35 (Wyo. 2012); Bell v. State, 2011 Ark. 
379, *1 (Ark. 2011); State v. Ninham, 797 N.W.2d 451, 463, 471 (Wis. 2011); People v. Adderley, 
No. B217620, 2011 WL 817751, *12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2d Dist. 2011) (unpublished); State v. 
Andrews, 329 S.W.3d 369, 377–78 (Mo. 2010); Meadoux v. State, 325 S.W.3d 189, 196 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2010); State v. Pierce, 225 P.3d 1146, 1147–48 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010). All of these 
courts have held that felony murder is a homicide offense and therefore does not fall under 
Graham’s categorical rule. Cf. Arrington v. State, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D155, 6 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) 
(refusing to apply Graham’s categorical ban to felony murder but holding that Graham requires a 
narrow proportionality review on a case-by-case basis for juveniles mandatorily sentenced to life 
without parole for accessorial felony murder). 
 28. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). 
 29. See 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011). The Equal Justice Initiative (EJI) argued both Miller v. 
Alabama and Jackson v. Hobbs. See Brief for Petitioner Miller, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 
(2012) (No. 10–9646), 2012 WL 92505, ECF No. 20; Brief for Petitioner Jackson, Jackson v. 
Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (Nov. 7, 2012) (No. 10–9647), 2012 WL 92506 [hereinafter Jackson Brief]. 
 30. In both cases, EJI argued for a categorical rule prohibiting life without parole for 
individuals fourteen and younger and alternatively for a rule prohibiting any mandatory sentence of 
life without parole. In Kuntrell Jackson’s case, EJI also argued for a rule prohibiting the sentence in 
cases involving accessorial felony murder. See Jackson Brief, supra note 29, 2012 WL 92506, *63–
66. EJI previously argued the companion case to Graham, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.  2059 
(2010), in which a mentally disabled thirteen-year-old was sentenced to life without parole for 
sexual battery. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Sullivan v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010) 
(No. 08-7621) (filed Dec. 4, 2008). Sullivan was dismissed as improvidently granted in a per 
curium opinion. 129 S. Ct. at 2059). EJI has been instrumental in challenging life without parole 
sentences for juveniles, and in the development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence challenging 
this punishment. See Children in Adult Prison, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, 
http://www.eji.org/childrenprison (last visited Feb. 19, 2013). 
 31. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460. 
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resentencing.32  
In reaching this holding, the Miller majority relied on two lines of 
precedent.33 First, it concluded that Roper and Graham require that a 
sentencing body “take into account how children are different, and how 
those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime 
in prison.”34 Second, because Graham likened juvenile parole to a sentence 
of death, Miller relied on the Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
requiring individualized sentencing in capital punishment,35 and concluded 
that “a sentencer [must] have the ability to consider the mitigating qualities 
of youth,”36 including the age and background of a child offender and the 
circumstances surrounding the offense.37 The Miller majority explained 
that although Graham’s “flat ban” against juvenile life without parole was 
explicitly confined to nonhomicide offenders, “none of what [it] said about 
children . . . is crime specific,” and its “reasoning implicates any life-
without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile.”38 The majority also 
explained that “given all” the Court has said “about children’s diminished 
culpability and heightened capacity for change” in Roper, Graham, and 
Miller, it “think[s] appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to this 
harshest penalty will be uncommon.”39 In other words, only in the most 
extreme cases involving juvenile offenders would a sentence of life 
without parole constitute a legally proportionate sentence under the Eighth 
Amendment.  
The Miller Court declined to categorically prohibit juvenile life without 
parole, or alternatively to address whether Graham requires a categorical 
rule prohibiting the sentence for those who did not kill or intend to kill.40 
However, Miller invalidated juvenile mandatory life without parole 
statutes in twenty-nine jurisdictions,41 and provides a chance at 
resentencing for at least 2,000 individuals sentenced under these statutes.42 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Id. at 2475. 
 33. Id. at 2463. 
 34. Id. at 2469. 
 35. Id. at 2467.  
 36. Id. at 2467, 2475 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 37. Id. at 2475.  
 38. Id. at 2465. 
 39. Id. at 2469. 
 40. See id. at 2469. Justice Stephen Breyer, joined by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, wrote a 
concurrence in which he argued that “the Eighth Amendment as interpreted in Graham forbids 
sentencing [a juvenile] to such a sentence, regardless of whether its application is mandatory or 
discretionary under state law.” Id. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring). See infra Part V. 
 41. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2470–71 n.9 (explaining that “26 states and the Federal Government 
make life without parole the mandatory . . . punishment for some form of murder” for children 
beginning at age fourteen or younger, Louisiana makes the punishment mandatory for children as 
young as fifteen, and Texas for seveteen-year-olds). 
 42. See id. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The Court accepts that over 2,000 of those 
[serving juvenile life without parole] received that sentence because it was mandated by a 
7
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Further, many of those mandatorily sentenced to life without parole were 
convicted of accessorial felony murder,43 and Miller therefore requires that 
they be resentenced.44 In resentencing them, the judge or jury is also 
required to consider any mitigating evidence, including their age when they 
committed their crime, their background, and other mitigating 
circumstances surrounding the offense.45 Because juveniles who do not kill 
or intend to kill cannot be classified among the most culpable juvenile 
offenders,46 Miller should result in resentencing these individuals to 
something less than life without parole (the harshest penalty available to 
juvenile offenders).  
This Note focuses on juvenile life without parole in the context of 
felony murder and makes two arguments. First, it argues that the Eighth 
Amendment, as interpreted by Graham, categorically prohibits sentencing 
those juveniles convicted of accessorial felony murder—those who do not 
kill or intend to kill—to life without parole. Second, it argues that lower 
courts properly applying Miller should resentence those who do not kill or 
intend to kill to something less than life without parole. Part I examines the 
case of Kuntrell Jackson—who was sentenced to juvenile life without 
parole for accessorial felony murder47—and compares it with Graham to 
raise questions about diminished culpability and proportionality in 
sentencing juveniles to the harshest of punishments. Part II traces the legal 
and political developments that transformed the juvenile justice system 
from one of rehabilitation into one of retribution, justifying the prosecution 
and sentencing of juveniles as adults and subjecting them to death in prison 
sentences. Part III explains how the Court has applied the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment to scale back 
the adult punishment of children, and where it has stopped short. Part IV 
discusses the doctrine of accessorial felony murder, and argues that the 
Court should extend its categorical rule in Graham to juveniles convicted 
of this offense. Finally, Part V makes two suggestions for lower courts 
                                                                                                                     
legislature.”).  
 43. There is no data that gives an estimate of how many of those mandatorily sentenced to life 
without parole are serving the sentence for felony murder. However, HRW estimates that at least 
26% of all individuals serving life without parole are serving the sentence because of felony 
murder. See supra note 24. Because most states classify felony murder as first degree murder, or a 
capital offense, see Richard A. Rosen, Felony Murder and the Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence of 
Death, 31 B.C. L. REV. 1103, 1105–06 (1990), and most mandatory juvenile life without parole 
statutes encompass first degree murder, see State-By-State Legal Resource Guide, UNIV. OF S.F. 
SCH. OF LAW (Mar. 1, 2013, 12:10 PM), http://www.usfca.edu/law/jlwop/resource_guide/, it is 
likely that HRW’s estimate also applies to those juveniles mandatorily sentenced to life without 
parole for felony murder. By this logic, there are at least 500 individuals serving mandatory life 
without parole for felony murder who must be resentenced under Miller. See supra note 42. 
 44. Miller, 132. S. Ct. at 2475. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring); see infra Section IV.A. 
 47. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461 (majority opinion). 
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resentencing juveniles under Miller. 
I.  KUNTRELL JACKSON AND THE CASE FOR REDEMPTION 
Kuntrell Jackson grew up in the public housing projects of Blytheville, 
Arkansas, a community racked by poverty, drugs, and violence.48 He had 
little in the way of role models. His father left before he was born and was 
replaced by his mother’s boyfriend: an abusive alcoholic, a leech on the 
family’s resources, and the only father figure Kuntrell ever knew.49 
Kuntrell’s mother went to prison for shooting a neighbor when he was six, 
and his older brother followed in her footsteps just seven years later.50 Not 
long after that, his mother’s boyfriend left, two of his teenage sisters 
became pregnant, and several other relatives were also sent to prison.51 
Perhaps in part because of these formidable challenges during childhood, 
Kuntrell’s mental capacity has been described as “borderline or near 
borderline,” and “at the 4th percentile compared to children his age.”52  
In 1999, seventeen days after Kuntrell turned fourteen, he, his older 
cousin Travis Booker, and another older boy Derrick Shields decided to 
rob the local Movie Magic video store while walking through a housing 
project in Blytheville.53 It was only once the boys were headed to the video 
store that Kuntrell realized that Shields was carrying a shotgun in his 
sleeve.54 Although the other boys went inside when they arrived at the 
store, Kuntrell chose to stay outside.55 Shields pointed the shotgun at the 
clerk, Laurie Troup, and demanded money six or seven times, to which she 
refused.56 Kuntrell entered the store during this interaction.57 The parties 
disputed at trial whether Kuntrell warned Troup that “[w]e ain’t playin’,” 
or told his codefendants “I thought you all was playin’.”58 When Troup 
threatened to call the police, Shields shot the clerk and the boys fled the 
video store without taking any money.59  
The prosecutor in Kuntrell’s case had the choice to send Kuntrell to 
juvenile court or to try him as an adult for either capital felony murder or 
                                                                                                                     
 48. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Jackson v. Arkansas, WL 478600 (Ark. Feb 9, 2011), 
petition for cert. filed, No. 09-145, 2011, 5 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Jackson Petition]. 
 49. Id. at 4–5.  
 50. Id. at 5.  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. at 5 (quoting the record). 
 53. Id. at 5; Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 758 (Ark. 2004). 
 54. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012).  
 55. Id. 
 56. Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 758–59. 
 57. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
 58. Id. The state presented codefendant Booker’s pretrial statement that Kuntrell said “we 
ain’t playin’.” Id. At trial Booker recanted this statement, and both he and Kuntrell testified that 
Kuntrell actually said “I thought you all was playin’.” Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 760. 
 59. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. 
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aggravated robbery.60 He chose to try him as an adult for both offenses.61 
Kuntrell’s trial counsel moved to transfer the case to juvenile court, but the 
trial court denied the motion after considering the statutory factors at the 
transfer hearing.62 In denying Jackson’s motion, the trial judge emphasized 
the “seriousness of the offense,” in particular the fact that the “offense 
involved a firearm, was for pecuniary gain, and endangered the life of 
another.”63 The judge did not appear to place any weight on Kuntrell’s 
traumatic upbringing, his nonviolent juvenile arrest history (involving 
shoplifting and three incidents of car theft), his limited involvement in the 
crime, and the fact that he inflicted no violence on the victim.64 Kuntrell 
remained in criminal court and was convicted by a jury of capital murder 
and aggravated robbery.65  
Under Arkansas’s felony murder statute,66 the state had a burden only to 
prove that Kuntrell had attempted to commit a robbery and that in the 
course of that offense he or his accomplice caused the clerk’s death “under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human 
life.”67 It was undisputed that Shields was the one who shot the clerk, and 
the prosecution was under no obligation to prove, and did not argue, that 
Kuntrell had participated in or intended the killing in any way.68 The only 
                                                                                                                     
 60. See id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (1998)). The Arkansas statute reads in 
relevant part: 
 
A prosecuting attorney may charge a juvenile in either the juvenile or criminal 
division of circuit court when a case involves a juvenile:  
(2) Fourteen (14) or fifteen (15) years old when he or she engages in conduct that, 
if committed by an adult, would be: (A) Capital murder, § 5-10-101; (B) Murder 
in the first degree, § 5-10-102 . . . .  
 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(c)(2) (1998). 
 61. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.  
 62. Id.; Jackson v. State, No. 02–535, 2003 WL 193412, at *1 (Ark. App. Jan. 29, 2003) 
(quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-318(g) (2002), which lists the statutory factors a trial judge must 
consider upon a motion to transfer or retain jurisdiction of a juvenile) (reviewing and affirming the 
circuit judge’s decision to deny Jackson’s motion to transfer to juvenile court).  
 63. Jackson, 2003 WL 193412, at *2. Other statutory factors the court considered included a 
psychiatric report concluding that Kuntrell had no psychiatric impairment, and testimony by a 
juvenile intake officer that no rehabilitation program existed for Kuntrell if convicted of capital 
murder. Id. at *1; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461. Under Arkansas law, a circuit court’s decision 
as to whether to transfer a juvenile is reversed only for clear error. Jackson, 2003 WL 193412, at 
*1–2.   
 64. See Jackson, 2003 WL 193412, at *1. 
 65. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2461.  
 66. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(1)(B) (2011). 
 67. Id.; see also Jackson v. State, 194 S.W.3d 757, 760 (Ark. 2004). 
 68. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468; Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 760. In his concurring opinion in 
Miller, Justice Breyer points out that the State was not required even to prove that Kuntrell acted 
with “extreme indifference,” but only that either one of his accomplices acted with extreme 
10
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/4
2013] BRINGING OUR CHILDREN BACK FROM THE LAND OF NOD 823 
 
evidence that could have suggested that Kuntrell had any intent to 
participate in the murder was the disputed statement Kuntrell made before 
Shields shot the clerk.69 Had the state been required to prove Kuntrell’s 
intent to participate in the killing, this evidence would almost certainly 
have been insufficient to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Based instead on his role in the attempted robbery, Kuntrell was convicted 
of capital murder, and under the Arkansas statute70 the judge had no choice 
but to sentence him to life imprisonment without parole.71 Neither the fact 
that he was fourteen years old nor the fact that he did not kill the victim 
could be considered as mitigating circumstances to change this unduly 
harsh outcome.72 The Arkansas Supreme Court refused to extend 
Graham’s holding to Kuntrell’s case and affirmed his sentence.73 Before 
the Supreme Court intervened in Miller, it appeared that Kuntrell’s 
decision to rob a video store with two older boys at the age of fourteen left 
him without any foreseeable future; he had been decided forever 
irredeemable by the State of Arkansas. 
Yet it is difficult to argue that Kuntrell Jackson is any more culpable 
than Terrence Graham, who received the same sentence for breaking the 
terms of his parole and committing an armed burglary.74 In that incident, 
Graham had forcibly entered the victim’s home with two older 
accomplices.75 Inside, he held a pistol to the victim’s chest, and all three 
boys barricaded the victim and his friend inside a closet before leaving and 
                                                                                                                     
indifference to the value of human life. 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 69. See supra note 59 and accompanying text; Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Breyer, J., 
concurring). The Arkansas statute provides an affirmative offense for capital felony murder if the 
defendant can prove that he did not commit the homicide “or in any way solicit, command, induce, 
procure, counsel, or aid in its commission.” Id. (majority opinion) (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-
10-101(b) (Repl.1997)). The jury did not grant Kuntrell this affirmative offense, apparently 
crediting Booker’s pretrial statement over the testimony at trial. See Jackson, 194 S.W.3d at 760.  
 70. The statute reads in relevant part: 
However, if the state waives the death penalty, stipulates that no aggravating 
circumstance exists, or stipulates that mitigating circumstances outweigh 
aggravating circumstances, then: (i) No hearing under subdivision (3)(A) of this 
section is required; and (ii) The trial court shall sentence the defendant to life 
imprisonment without parole.  
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B) (Repl. 2006). 
 71. See Jackson v. Norris, 378 S.W.3d 103, 107 (2011) (Brown, J., concurring) (citing ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-4-602(3)(B) (Repl. 2006), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2011), rev’d and remanded 
sub nom., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012). Because the Supreme Court banned the death 
penalty for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005), life imprisonment without 
parole was statutorily mandated by Kuntrell’s conviction in Alabama. 
 72. Jackson, 378 S.W.3d at 106–07 (Brown, J., concurring). 
 73. Id. at 106. 
 74. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2019–20 (2010). 
 75. Id. at 2018. 
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allegedly attempting a second robbery where one of his accomplices was 
shot.76 If anything, Kuntrell is less culpable than Graham. Unlike Graham, 
he did not hold a gun or any other weapon during the attempted robbery; 
nor was he aware that his accomplice carried a gun until moments before 
the robbery.77 And he did not use any violence against the video store 
clerk.78 When compared to Graham’s case and the Supreme Court’s 
holding that Graham can never be condemned to die in prison for a violent 
crime he committed days before his eighteenth birthday,79 the possibility 
that Kuntrell Jackson should ever be sentenced to life without the 
possibility of parole makes little sense. The facts of Kuntrell’s case—
including his troubled background and the fact that he was fourteen years 
old when he committed his crime—show that he is not “among the worst 
offenders.”80 How then, did he receive the most severe punishment 
available to juvenile defendants—a punishment intended for dangerous 
adult offenders and one that reflects a complete departure from the goals of 
the juvenile justice system? 
II.  REDEMPTION OR RETRIBUTION? THE EVOLUTION OF JUVENILE 
PUNISHMENT 
Until the late nineteenth century, child offenders in the United States 
over the age of fifteen were tried as adults,81 and children twelve and 
younger were subjected to criminal prosecutions resembling those for 
adults.82 Much like children tried in the adult system today, child offenders 
faced all of the penalties that adult offenders faced.83 This Part sketches the 
evolution of the juvenile justice system in the United States from one 
intended to end the practice of treating juveniles as adults in order to 
rehabilitate them, to one that allows children like Kuntrell Jackson to be 
tried as adults and condemned to die in prison.  
                                                                                                                     
 76. Id. at 2018–19. Although the judge did not explicitly sentence Graham to life 
imprisonment without parole, his sentence of life was statutorily mandated because Florida had 
abolished parole. Id. at 2020 (citing FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(e) (2003)). At oral argument, Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg suggested that this sentence was particularly shocking because “it was far 
beyond what the prosecutor recommended.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, Graham v. 
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (No. 08–7412).  
 77. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2461 (2012). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. 
 80. Id. at 2025.  
 81. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 14. 
 82. Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 
143, 145 (2003). 
 83. Id.   
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A.  Recognizing that Juveniles are Different: Reform in the Progressive 
Era 
By the end of the nineteenth century, social reformers inspired by the 
Progressive movement84 advocated a more enlightened approach to 
juvenile justice85 premised on the notion that children’s great potential for 
rehabilitation should guide any system holding them accountable for 
criminal acts.86 This new paradigm was founded on an understanding that 
juvenile offenders lacked the developmental maturity to make informed 
judgments and to distinguish right from wrong, undermining the retributive 
and deterrence justifications for traditional punishment.87 Although 
scholars have pointed out that this view of children tended to be overly 
simplistic,88 reformers’ contention that juveniles were “more likely to 
benefit from treatment and intervention” than from harsh punishment and 
long incarceration89 is supported by modern empirical research.90  
By the first quarter of the twentieth century, all but two states had 
established separate juvenile courts.91 The objective of the juvenile system 
was to develop “open-ended, informal, and highly flexible policies” aimed 
at rehabilitating juveniles to become productive citizens.92 In this way, 
juvenile courts were developed as a clear alternative to adult, retributive 
justice.93 What emerged was a system for child offenders based on the 
                                                                                                                     
 84. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a 
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV.189, 193 (2007) [hereinafter A Century of Juvenile 
Justice]. 
 85. Id. at 191–93. 
 86. See, e.g., THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 14; Elizabeth Cauffman, et al., 
Justice for Juveniles: New Perspectives on Adolescents’ Competence and Culpability, 18 Q.L.R. 
403, 403 (1999); Christopher Slobogin & Mark R. Fondacaro, Juvenile Justice: The Fourth Option, 
95 IOWA L. REV. 1, 8 (2009) (“The rehabilitative vision strongly informed the very first juvenile 
court.”); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 146. 
 87. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental 
Perspective on Juvenile Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 143–44 (1998).  
 88. See, e.g., Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 86, at 3; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 
146 (explaining that the “persuasive power” of reformers’ “strategy seemed to depend on selectively 
invoking images that emphasized—and at times exaggerated—the child-like characteristics of 
young offenders”). 
 89. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 146. 
 90. Six empirical studies show that juveniles convicted of violent offenses in criminal court 
have significantly higher recidivism rates as compared to similar offenders adjudicated in juvenile 
court. RICHARD E. REDDING, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE TRANSFER LAWS: AN EFFECTIVE 
DETERRENT TO DELINQUENCY? 4 (2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp1220595. 
pdf. 
 91. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 14.  
 92. Id. at 14 (quoting Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: 
Legislative Changes in Juvenile Waiver Statutes, 78 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 474 (1987)). 
 93. A Century of Juvenile Justice, supra note 84, at 189, 193; Timothy J. Pillari, Rethinking 
Juvenile Justice: Catholic Social Thought as a Vehicle for Reform, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & 
PUB. POL’Y 167, 167–68 (2008). 
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notion of parens patria:94 the state’s role in addressing delinquent children 
was not to punish them for past acts, but to protect them and mold them 
with each child’s best interests in mind, a determination to be made at the 
court’s discretion.95  
 For the next fifty years, most juvenile courts had exclusive jurisdiction 
of child offenders under the age of eighteen.96 This system turned out to 
have significant shortcomings. First, because these courts were understood 
to function according to the best interests of any child under their 
jurisdiction, substantive standards and procedural protections—including 
due process—were seen as an unnecessary.97 Second, while most child 
offenders were kept out of the adult system, they could be transferred to 
adult court if a judge determined that it was in the “best interests” of both 
the public and the child to do so.98 This gave judges wide authority to 
intervene in the lives of juvenile offenders’ in inconsistent and often 
intrusive ways.99  
B.  Return to Retribution 
1.  Gault, the Implementation of Due Process, and the Return to an 
Adult Model of Retributive Justice 
Public concern over abuse of wide judicial discretion in juvenile courts 
led the Supreme Court to intervene in the 1960s by requiring more formal 
procedure within the juvenile system.100 In the landmark case In re 
Gault,101 the Court rejected the doctrine of parens patriae as valid 
justification for the denial of due process and implemented many 
procedural rights previously regarded as unnecessary for the juvenile 
system.102 In poignant language, the majority stated that “[u]nder our 
                                                                                                                     
 94. A Century of Juvenile Justice, supra note 84, at 189; Slobogin & Fondacaro, supra note 
86, at 9. 
 95. A Century of Juvenile Justice, supra note 84, at 189. 
 96. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS 
AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 94 (2006).  
 97. Id. at 96. 
 98. Id. at 94. See also THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 14.  
 99. See Judge Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise, 9 BARRY L. REV. 67, 69 & n.17, 79–80 
(2007). 
 100. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 96. Judge Blitzman explains that “[s]helters and 
houses of refuge [for juvenile defendants] had ‘devolved’ in many jurisdictions into locked training 
schools and places of detention.” Blitzman, supra note 99, at 69. 
 101. 387 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1967). The defendant in Gault was judged delinquent in juvenile court 
for making “lewd remarks” in a prank call, id. at 4. In a hearing devoid of procedure or reference to 
substantive law, he was committed to a reformatory institution until the age of 21. Id.  
 102. Id. at 17–21. The Court noted that an adult facing similar charges would have faced a fine 
of $5 to $50 and “imprisonment in jail for not more than 2 months.” Id. at 69. The Court held that 
Due Process requirements attach to juvenile proceedings and that Gault’s proceedings clearly 
offended these standards. Id. at 4, 13. Specifically, it held that in proceedings in which a juvenile is 
judged delinquent and which may result in commitment to a state institution, id. at 13, a juvenile 
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Constitution, the condition of being a boy does not justify a kangaroo 
court.”103 The Court explained that “[t]he absence of substantive standards 
has not necessarily meant that children receive careful, compassionate, 
individualized treatment,” the primary objectives of the juvenile system, 
but instead that “[d]epartures from established principles of due process 
have frequently resulted . . . in arbitrariness.”104  
Professor Kim Taylor-Thompson, of the New York University School 
of Law, has aptly pointed out that in implementing procedures formerly 
reserved for adult offenders, the Supreme Court did not seek to “re-orient 
the therapeutic bent of the juvenile justice system to match the punitive 
goals of the adult system.”105 Rather, the majority in Gault applauded the 
separate juvenile system’s objectives to treat, rehabilitate, and care for 
juvenile offenders as an alternative to harsh, adult punishment.106 As such, 
the Court explained that it did not intend to undermine these 
“commendable principles” by requiring procedural protections within that 
system.107  
Unfortunately, as Professor Taylor-Thompson has argued and other 
scholars have suggested, “Gault’s legacy may be more complicated than 
the Court ever appreciated.”108 Gault marked the beginning of an ironic 
shift in juvenile justice: it was intended to protect the integrity of a separate 
juvenile system by borrowing necessary procedural safeguards from the 
adult system.109 But the more the juvenile system has taken on elements of 
the adult system, the more it has synthesized with it, and “the more 
difficult the task has become to distinguish between adolescents and adults 
in any meaningful way or to justify the continued existence of a separate 
system of adjudication for youths.”110 In this way, Gault opened the door to 
treating juveniles like adults.111 This synthesis has resulted in what the 
Supreme Court described in Gault as “the worst of both worlds,” where the 
“child [offender] . . . gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the 
                                                                                                                     
has the right to notice, id. at 33, to counsel, id. at 41, to protection against self-incrimination, id. at 
55, to question witnesses, id. at 57, and to appellate review, id. at 58.  
 103. Id. at 28. 
 104. Id. at 18–19. 
 105. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 147. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 15–16, 27. Specifically, it commended the separate juvenile system’s objective to 
treat, rehabilitate, and care for juvenile offenders as an alternative to harsh, adult punishment. Id. 
 108. Id. at 147. See also, e.g., Blitzman, supra note 99, at 67–68.  
 109. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18–19. 
 110. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 147.  
 111. Id. (“Extension of adult-like constitutional status may have contributed to the perception 
that courts could treat adolescents as adults. That courts should treat adolescents as adults then 
deceptively seemed only a small step. Particularly given the common perception that violent crime 
warrants more severe sanctions than would likely issue in juvenile court, distinctions between 
juvenile and adult sentencing have come to appear anachronistic.”). 
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solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children.”112  
2.  The 1980s and the Myth of the Juvenile Super-Predator 
While Gault inadvertently suggested a departure from rehabilitative 
ideals, public fear over the steep increase in violent juvenile crime in the 
1980s explicitly accelerated this departure.113 Gun homicides by 
adolescents rose sharply in the mid 1980s, fell after 1993, and then 
stabilized.114 Although this increase in juvenile crime did not last, it was 
met with widespread public panic, coinciding with the escalation of the 
“War on Drugs” and a political climate of increased criminalization.115 
Policy makers flooded the public discourse with dire predictions of 
juvenile crime sprees and the imminent proliferation of delinquent juvenile 
criminals—in particular, juvenile criminals of color.116 Then Princeton 
University Professor John DiIulio popularized the term “super-predator,” 
spinning a lurid, racially-colored image in countless national publications 
of inner-city streets crawling with these remorseless, amoral juveniles.117 
DiIulio made a dramatic forecast that “by the year 2010, there will be 
                                                                                                                     
 112. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18 n.23 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)). 
Ironically, this is due in part to the Court’s own decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 
528, 545 (1971), just four years after Gault, in which it held that jury trials are not constitutionally 
required in juvenile courts (although states are authorized to implement them). Thirty-one states 
have since passed laws proscribing any right to a jury trial in juvenile proceedings. NAT’L CTR. FOR 
JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE DELINQUENTS’ RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.njdc.info/pdf/2008_right_to_jury_snapshot.pdf.  
 113. See, e.g., THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 15; Taylor-Thompson, supra note 
82, at 148. 
 114. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS CRIME DATA BRIEF, HOMICIDE TRENDS IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2002 UPDATE 2 (2002), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/htus02.pdf. In 
1984, there were just under 1,000 arrests for juvenile homicide. Id. This number peaked with 3,284 
arrests in 1993, declined to 919 arrests by 1999, and stabilized with 956 arrests in 2006. UNIV. OF 
VA., CURRY SCHOOL OF EDUC., YOUTH VIOLENCE PROJECT: SCHOOL VIOLENCE MYTHS, 
http://curry.virginia.edu/research/projects/violence-in-schools/school-violence-myths (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2013).  
 115. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 96. In 1983, then President Ronald Reagan 
signed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, 21 U.S.C.A. § 801 (1986), appropriating $1.7 billion to 
fight the drug war, and creating mandatory minimum penalties for drug offenses.  
 116. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 148. 
 117. See, e.g., John J. DiIulio, Jr., My Black Crime Problem, and Ours, CITY J., Spring 1996, 
available at http://www.city-journal.org/html/6_2_my_black.html (“[N]ot only is the number of 
young black criminals likely to surge, but also the black crime rate . . . is increasing, so that as many 
as half of these juvenile super-predators could be young black males.”); John J. DiIulio, Jr., The 
Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1, available at 
http://cooley.libarts.wsu.edu/schwartj/criminology/dilulio.pdf (“On the horizon . . . are tens of 
thousands of severely morally impoverished juvenile super-predators. They are perfectly capable of 
committing the most heinous acts of physical violence for the most trivial reasons. . . . They live by 
the meanest code . . . that reinforces rather than restrains their violent, hair-trigger 
mentality . . . . [F]or as long as their youthful energies hold out, they will do what comes ‘naturally’: 
murder, rape, rob, assault, burglarize, deal deadly drugs, and get high.”).  
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 65, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol65/iss3/4
2013] BRINGING OUR CHILDREN BACK FROM THE LAND OF NOD 829 
 
270,000 more juvenile super-predators on the streets than there were in 
1990.”118 This widespread, sensationalist discourse painted a vivid picture 
in the public’s mind of delinquent children so dangerous and wayward that 
traditional notions of juveniles as inherently less culpable and more 
amenable to rehabilitation were no longer palatable.119  
Today it is clear that this panic was unfounded.120 John DiIulio himself, 
as one of the amici who submitted a brief on behalf of Kuntrell Jackson,121 
has discredited his super-predator discourse as a myth and “expressed 
regret, acknowledging that the prediction was never fulfilled.”122 Still, 
public fear of juvenile crime propelled a monumental shift in this nation’s 
approach to juvenile justice, and has resulted in the increasingly punitive 
adjudication of children that fails to differentiate them from their adult 
counterparts. This shift has all but vitiated the fundamental principle of 
rehabilitation underlying a separate system of juvenile justice.123  
C.  Beyond Redemption: Sending “Throwaway” Children into the Adult 
Criminal Justice System  
“You say the sanctity of human life, but you’re dealing with a 14-year-old 
being sentenced to life in prison, so he will die in prison without any hope. 
I mean, essentially, you’re making a 14-year-old throwaway person.”124 
1.  Adjudicating Children in Adult Court 
The increase in juvenile crime beginning in the 1980s and the resulting 
panic sparked an unprecedented legislative response from almost all fifty 
states in the 1990s.125 The public abandoned its previous concern over the 
abuse of discretion and arbitrary treatment within juvenile courts pre-
                                                                                                                     
 118. John DiIulio, How to Stop the Coming Crime Wave, 1 (New York: Manhattan Institute, 
1996)).  
 119. See Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 148–49. As Professor Taylor-Thompson points 
out, racial stigmatization of young black males was particularly contagious. Id. Beginning in the 
early 1980s, a dramatic disparity grew between the relative percentage of black and white juveniles 
admitted to adult prisons. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 15. 
 120. See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 121. Brief of Jeffrey Fagan, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners Jackson and Miller 
at 19, 30, Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (No. 10-9646), ECF No. 29 (the amici argue 
that the super-predator myth has turned out to be completely unsubstantiated by scientific and 
empirical evidence, and that empirical studies show that the increasing incarceration and ratcheted 
sentences that followed are “not causally responsible for the decline in juvenile homicide rates.”) 
 122. Id. at 19. 
 123. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 96. 
 124. Transcript of Oral Argument, Jackson v. Hobbs, 132 S. Ct. 548 (2012) (No. 10–9647) 
(Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg). 
 125. Id.  
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Gault,126 and replaced it with the sentiment that existing criminal laws for 
juveniles were too lenient.127 Incited by the public’s moral panic, 
legislators capitalized on phrases such as “adult time for adult crime.”128  
States began a decades-long trend of vastly expanding juvenile transfer 
laws.129 These laws enable states to try juveniles in adult court,130 and to 
sentence juveniles beyond the upper age of juvenile court jurisdiction, 
which is set at twenty-one in most states.131 By 1997, forty-seven states had 
adopted transfer laws.132 Currently, every state has at least one form of 
juvenile transfer, and most states have multiple ways of imposing adult 
sanctions on juvenile offenders.133 There are three main mechanisms for 
transferring juveniles to adult court,134 and forty-four states impose some 
form of mandatory waiver.135 Many of these laws have “shift[ed] 
decisionmaking authority from judges to prosecutors, and replace[d] 
individualized discretion with automatic and categorical mechanisms.”136 
The Supreme Court in Miller noted that of the twenty-nine jurisdictions 
that impose mandatory life without parole on juveniles, “about half” have 
mandatory transfer laws that “place at least some juvenile homicide 
offenders in adult court automatically, with no apparent opportunity to seek 
transfer [back] to juvenile court.”137 Juveniles are therefore often 
                                                                                                                     
 126. See supra Part II.B. 
 127. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 147. 
 128. See THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 2, 16. See also THE LIVES OF JUVENILE 
LIFERS, supra note 14, at 6. 
 129. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, 
TRYING JUVENILES AS ADULTS: AN ANALYSIS OF STATE TRANSFER LAWS AND REPORTING 8 (2011) 
[hereinafter STATE TRANSFER LAWS]. 
 130. Id. at 8. 
 131. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 103. 
 132. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 16–17. According to SNYDER & SICKMUND, 
supra note 96, at 96–97, between 1992 and 1997 forty-five states changed their laws to enable the 
transfer of juvenile offenders to adult court; thirteen states adopted or modified statutes that 
imposed mandatory periods of incarceration for juveniles convicted of certain crimes; forty-seven 
states changed confidentiality provisions making records more widely available to the public; and 
twenty-two states passed laws increasing victims’ rights in juvenile crimes.  
 133. STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 129, at 2. 
 134. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 96, at 110. First, judicial waiver is common to the most 
states and gives judges authority to waive juvenile jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 110. 
Second, mandatory statutory exclusion provisions require that juveniles of a certain age or charged 
with certain offenses—including those tried with felony murder—be tried in adult court. Id. at 113–
14. This is the most commonly used form of transfer. Id. Finally, direct file or prosecutorial 
discretion provisions like the Arkansas statute in Kuntrell’s case, allow prosecutors to file juvenile 
cases in either juvenile or adult court. Id. at 110. 
 135. STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 129, at 2–3. The three forms of mandatory waiver are 
mandatory judicial waiver, statutory exclusion, and once an adult, always an adult laws, which 
require criminal prosecution of any juvenile who has previously been tried as an adult. Id.  
 136. Id. at 9. 
 137. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474 (2012). 
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transferred to adult court with little or no consideration of their child status 
or the mitigating circumstances surrounding their offense.138 
Regardless of the mechanism, once a child is transferred to criminal 
court, “the features that distinguish [children] from adults . . . put[s the 
child] at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”139 Children 
often “mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal 
justice system,”140 and are ill-equipped to “deal with police officers or 
prosecutors (including on a plea agreement),” or to aid their lawyers in 
their own defense.141 Once convicted in adult court, mandatory sentencing 
laws proscribe age and other mitigating factors from weighing in the 
determination of a child offender’s punishment, resulting in the sentencing 
of children such as Kuntrell Jackson to life in prison without the possibility 
of parole. This outcome “ignores that [these children] might have been 
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for incompetencies 
associated with youth.”142  
2.  A Misguided Approach 
“In uncertainty I am certain that underneath their topmost layers of frailty 
men want to be good and want to be loved. Indeed, most of their vices are 
attempted short cuts to love. When a man comes to die, no matter what his 
talents and influence and genius, if he dies unloved his life must be a 
failure to him and his dying a cold horror.”143 
It is unfortunate that society has deviated so far in its treatment of child 
offenders that thousands of children who commit criminal acts are no 
longer deemed worthy of empathy, compassion, or redemption. Although 
there has been a steady decline in juvenile crime since 1994, there has been 
no measurable attempt among states to reconsider the draconian shift in 
juvenile adjudication.144 While research shows that the public generally 
supports prosecuting juveniles in adult court, the public “does not favor 
giving juveniles full adult sentences, placing them in adult correctional 
facilities, or abandoning rehabilitative goals.”145 This may be because 
                                                                                                                     
 138. The Miller majority noted that “[e]ven when States give transfer-stage discretion to 
judges, it has limited utility,” because “the decisionmaker typically will have only partial 
information at this early, pretrial stage about either the child or the circumstances of his offense” 
and “the question at transfer hearings may differ dramatically from the issue at post-trial 
sentencing.” Id.  
 139. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010).  
 140. Id. at 2032. 
 141. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012). 
 142. Id.  
 143. JOHN STEINBECK, EAST OF EDEN 412–13 (John Steinbeck Centennial ed. 1902–2002, 
Penguin Books 1952). 
 144. STATE TRANSFER LAWS, supra note 129, at 9. 
 145. See Erin Flynn, Dismantling the Felony-Murder Rule: Juvenile Deterrence and 
Retribution Post-Roper v. Simmons, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1049, 1059 (2008) (citing DAVID L. 
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many people believe that some children should be punished more harshly 
than juvenile jurisdiction allows, but do not realize that there is little 
middle ground, and that states have created an all-or-nothing system: those 
juveniles prosecuted in adult court are often sentenced and incarcerated 
without any consideration of their juvenile status. 
Still, proponents of harsh sanctions might be tempted to argue that the 
decline in juvenile crime since the 1990s is a direct result of draconian 
penological treatment and increased incarceration of juveniles since the 
1980s.146 However, criminologists caution that it is incorrect to assume 
that changes in the crime rate are a direct correlation of changes in penal 
policy or punishment.147 More concretely, empirical studies suggest that 
the sweeping legislative changes and accompanying increases in juvenile 
incapacitation “were not casually responsible for the decline in juvenile 
homicide rates” or other serious crime that occurred in the mid 1990s.148  
Moreover, research suggests that public safety is not served by the 
permanent incapacitation of child offenders. Nueroscience shows that they 
will grow and mature in ways that will increase their ability to make 
reasoned decisions and to regulate their impulse control,149 and numerous 
longitudinal studies show that as a result of this process the majority of 
                                                                                                                     
MEYERS, BOYS AMONG MEN: TRYING AND SENTENCING JUVENILES AS ADULTS 4, 9–10, 127 (2005)). 
 146. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime 
Regulation, 71 LA. L. REV. 35, 51 (2010). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Brief of Jeffrey Fagan, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 121, at 
30–34 (citing RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE 
FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 26 (2011)); David McDowall & Simon I. Singer, 
Criminalizing Delinquency: The Deterrent Effects of the New York Juvenile Offender Law, 22 LAW 
AND SOC’Y REV. 521 (1988); Eric L. Jensen & Linda K. Metsger, A Test of the Deterrent Effect of 
Legislative Waiver on Violent Juvenile Crime, 40 CRIME AND DELINQ. 96 (1994)). The authors 
explain that empirical studies show that jurisdictions with higher juvenile incarceration rates have 
not had greater decreases in juvenile crime, and that jurisdictions that have greatly reduced their 
juvenile incarceration rates have not had increases in juvenile crime. Id. Similarly, the rate at which 
states imposed juvenile life without parole has not shown any correlation to juvenile homicide rates 
during the 1980s and 1990s, which was consistent across the states. Id. at 32–33. 
 149. See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANN. REV. 
CLINICAL PYSCHOL. 459, 466 (2009). Steinberg explains that “risky behavior in adolescence is the 
product of the interaction between two distinct neurobiological systems,” a “socioemotional 
system” in the limbic and paralimbic areas of the brain, and a “cognitive control system,” in the 
lateral prefontal and parietal cortices. Id. Adolescence is marked “by a rapid and dramatic increase 
in dopaminergic activity within the socioemotional system around the time of puberty, which is 
presumed to lead to increases in reward seeking.” Id. Unlike adults, however, adolescents do not yet 
have “the structural maturation of the cognitive control system and its connections to areas of the 
socioemotional system,” or the ability to exercise judgment to temper this heightened degree of risk-
taking. Id. Steinberg explains that this is “a maturational process that is gradual, unfolds over the 
course of adolescence, and permits more advanced self- regulation and impulse control.” Id. This 
gap in development “creates a period of heightened vulnerability to risk taking during middle 
adolescence.” Id. One writer has characterized this process as similar to “starting the engines 
without a skilled driver behind the wheel.” Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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child offenders will desist all criminal behavior.150 As the sobering process 
of maturation inevitably occurs,151 these individuals will likely feel deep 
regret for what they did and attempt to redefine themselves not by their 
painful adolescent transgressions, but by their potential as mature, 
discerning adults.152 And even though almost any rational person can 
recognize the illogic of defining someone by their worst adolescent 
decisions and acts, a sentence of life without parole means that none of 
these considerations matter.153  
Although the Court in Miller declined to categorically prohibit a 
sentence of life without parole for juveniles, Miller does prohibit a 
sentencer from failing to consider a juvenile’s child status “in imposing a 
State’s harshest penalties.”154 The majority explained that in light of 
“children’s diminished culpability and heightened capacity for 
change . . . appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles” to life without 
the possibility of parole “will be uncommon.”155 Therefore, even if states 
continue to adjudicate certain juvenile offenders in adult court in order to 
punish them more harshly than the juvenile system permits, current Eighth 
Amendment jurisprudence demands that the majority of these children be 
given a second chance. Part III sketches this jurisprudence to show how the 
Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment to scale back the adult punishment of children. 
III.  JUVENILE PUNISHMENT AND CURRENT EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Eighth Amendment Framework  
The Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment 
protects individuals from excessive sanctions by ensuring that punishment 
for a crime is proportionate to both the offense committed and the 
                                                                                                                     
 150. See, e.g., id. at 478 (explaining that according to most studies only 5%–10% of child 
offenders become chronic offenders); Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 156 (citing John H. Laub 
& Robert J. Sampson, Understanding Desistance from Crime, 28 CRIME & JUST. 1 (2001); Terrie E. 
Moffitt, Adolescent-Limited and Life-Course Persistent Antisocial Behavior: A Developmental 
Taxonomy, 100 PYSCHOL. REV. 674, 675–77 (1993); Neal Shover & Carol Y. Thompson, Age, 
Differential Expectations, and Crime Desistance, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1992)). 
 151. See supra note 146. 
 152. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2032 (2010) (“Maturity can lead to that 
considered reflection which is the foundation for remorse, renewal, and re-habilitation.”); see also 
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (“Deciding that a ‘juvenile offender will forever be a 
danger to society’ would require ‘making a judgment that he is incorrigible—but ‘incorrigibility is 
inconsistent with youth.’”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 153. Tragically, the sentence also eliminates any incentive for these children to transform 
themselves into responsible, productive individuals, because they know they have no hope of 
reentering society. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032.  
 154. Id. at 2468. 
 155. Id. at 2469. 
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characteristics of the offender.156 The Court views this concept of 
proportionality not through “a historical prism” but “according to the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing 
society.”157 The Court has used two approaches to review the 
proportionality of sentences to determine whether they constitute cruel and 
unusual punishment.158 The first approach is a narrow proportionality 
review, or an as-applied challenge to the length of a term of years.159  
The second approach is the use of categorical bans, which includes two 
lines of precedent addressing the proportionality of punishment.160 The 
first line of precedent involves categorical bans on sentences that are 
disproportionate because of the nature of the offense or the characteristics 
of the offender.161 The Court has banned the imposition of the death 
penalty on those convicted of nonhomicide crimes,162 on mentally retarded 
defendants,163 and on children.164 Also included in this line of cases is 
Graham, in which the Court likened juvenile life without parole to a 
sentence of death.165 The second line of precedent involves those cases in 
which the Court has prohibited the mandatory imposition of capital 
punishment, and required that a sentencer—in deciding whether to impose 
death—consider any mitigating evidence a defendant presents regarding 
                                                                                                                     
 156. Id. at 2463. 
 157. Id. at 2464 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) and Trop v. Dulles, 356 
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). Chief Justice Earl Warren first articulated this standard in Trop v. Dulles: 
“The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of 
man. . . . The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
the progress of a maturing society.” 356 U.S. at 100–01. 
 158. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021. 
 159. Id. The Supreme Court has rarely invalidated individual sentences on this “narrow 
proportionality principle,” which “forbids only extreme sentences . . . ‘grossly disproportionate’ to 
the crime.” See id. at 2022 (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991), in which the 
Court upheld a sentence of life without parole for a defendant convicted of possession of cocaine). 
 160. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012). 
 161. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022. 
 162. Id. (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2660 (2008) (holding that the Eighth 
Amendment forbids capital punishment “for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and 
was not intended to result, in the death of the victim”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) 
(holding that the Eighth Amendment forbids capital punishment for felony murder where the 
defendant “does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place”); and Coker v. 
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that capital punishment is “grossly disproportionate 
and excessive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by the Eighth 
Amendment . . .”)).  
 163. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 
(2005), the Court relied heavily on its reasoning in Atkins and concluded that juveniles, like those 
with diminished mental capacity, are never among the most culpable offenders and are therefore 
less deserving of the harshest punishment.  
 164. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
 165. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046. 
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his characteristics and the circumstances surrounding his offense.166 This 
rule is meant to ensure that death is reserved for “the most culpable 
defendants” who commit “the most serious offenses.”167 Miller is based on 
both of these strands of precedent.168 
Once it establishes that the adoption of a categorical rule is at issue, the 
Court employs an analysis of “evolving standards of decency” to determine 
whether the punishment is cruel and unusual. 169 This is a two-part test.170 
First, the Court “considers objective indicia of society’s standards, as 
expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether 
there is a national consensus against the sentencing practice at issue.”171 
Next, “guided by the ‘standards elaborated by controlling precedents and 
by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth 
Amendment’s text, history, meaning and purpose,’”172 the Court must 
“determine in the exercise of its own independent judgment whether the 
punishment in question” is cruel or unusual.173 This is largely a 
proportionality inquiry requiring consideration of “the culpability of the 
offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the 
severity of the punishment in question.”174 A fundamental aspect of the 
Court’s inquiry is its analysis of “whether the challenged sentencing 
practice serves penological goals.”175 “A sentence lacking any legitimate 
                                                                                                                     
 166. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463–64 (2012) (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 
428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion) and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)). 
 167. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. 
 168. Id. at 2463–64. 
 169. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This is the “unusual” aspect of the analysis. See 
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice John Roberts and Justices 
Clarence Thomas and Samuel Alito each wrote dissenting opinions in Miller, in which they 
criticized the majority for dispensing with objective indicia and deciding Miller solely on their own 
views of what is proportionate. See id. at 2477–78 (“Today, the Court invokes [the Eighth 
Amendment] to ban a punishment that the Court does not itself characterize as unusual, and that 
could not plausibly be described as such.”); id. at 2486 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2490 (Alito, 
J., dissenting) (“What today’s decision shows it that our Eighth Amendment cases are no longer tied 
to any objective indicia of society’s standards.”).  
 172. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2022 (quoting Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 
(2008)). 
 173. Id. (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005)).  
 174. Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 568). Although the Supreme Court has recited both steps as 
necessary to its proportionality review, see id., it has not clarified whether any particular weight 
should be given to either, stating only that “[c]ommunity consensus, while ‘entitled to great 
weight,’ is not itself determinative of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual.” Id. at 2026 
(citing Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2658). Contra Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge 
Juvenile Transfer Laws, 71 LA L. REV. 99, 113 (asserting that the Supreme Court “has not clarified 
whether one or both prongs must be met before finding the sentence unconstitutional”). 
 175. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032. 
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penological justification is by its nature disproportionate.”176 This Note 
focuses on the second part of the Court’s analysis—the proportionality 
inquiry—to explain how the Court has interpreted the Eighth Amendment 
to limit the adult punishment of children.177  
B.  Roper v. Simmons and Graham v. Florida: Death Is Different, But 
Children Are Too 
In Roper and Graham, the Supreme Court considered the 
proportionality of adult punishment on juvenile offenders, and established 
that juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults and “cannot with 
reliability be classified among the worst offenders.”178 In both cases, the 
Court stated that developmental differences in juveniles make them “less 
deserving of the most severe punishments.”179 The Court relied on 
nueroscientific research mapping adolescent brain structure, as well as 
social science, to articulate three primary reasons for juveniles’ lessened 
culpability.180 First, juveniles “lack maturity” and possess “underdeveloped 
responsibility,” leading to “impetuous and ill-considered actions and 
decisions.” 181 Second, juveniles “are more vulnerable or susceptible to 
negative influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure,” and 
“lack the freedom that adults have to extricate themselves from a 
criminogenic setting.”182 Third, juveniles have characters that are “not as 
well formed” and possess traits (inhibiting their maturity and judgment) 
that are more “transitory and less fixed.”183 The Court concluded that all of 
these characteristics show that juveniles have a great capacity for change 
and rehabilitation.184  
In Roper, the Court set aside Christopher Simmons’ death sentence for 
the burglary and cold-blooded murder of an older woman, a crime it 
described as “outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman.”185 
By choosing to grant certiorari in Simmons’ case, the Supreme Court made 
                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. at 2028. 
 177. The dissenting opinions in Miller, see supra note 171, show how four justices of the 
current Court take issue with this interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. For example, Justices 
Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia believe that the Eighth Amendment should be interpreted 
according to its “original understanding,” which they believe does not include a “proportionality 
principle” of punishment. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2483–84 (2012) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Justice Thomas suggests that any punishment that was not considered cruel and unusual 
at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, should not be so considered now. See id. at n.2. 
 178. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 569). 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id.  
 181. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026. 
 185. Roper, 543 U.S. at 556.  
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a resolute statement that child offenders are fundamentally different from 
adults in ways that bear so profoundly on their culpability that no matter 
how heinous their crime, they can never be considered among the most 
culpable offenders.186 It accordingly imposed a categorical ban, in the case 
of juvenile offenders, on death—the most severe punishment for any 
offender.187  
In Graham, the Court stopped short of fully extending Roper’s logic 
when it drew a line between the culpability of juvenile homicide and 
nonhomicide offenders and imposed a categorical ban on life without 
parole only for the latter.188 The Court found that those juveniles who “do 
not kill or intend to kill ha[ve] a twice diminished moral culpability.”189 
Next, the Court drew parallels between a sentence of life without parole for 
a juvenile offender—the harshest penalty available to a juvenile—and a 
sentence of death.190 It explained that although “a death sentence is unique 
in its severity and irrevocability,” a sentence of “life without parole 
share[s] some characteristics with . . . death . . . that [is] shared by no other 
sentence.”191 It recognized that in light of the fundamental differences 
between juveniles and adults enumerated in Roper,192 life without parole is 
“an especially harsh punishment for a juvenile,” because on average it 
causes a juvenile to serve a greater percentage of his life in prison than an 
adult; and its complete denial of any hope of redemption is infinitely 
harsher in the case of a juvenile.193 Finally, in applying its proportionality 
review, the Court found that life without parole does not serve any of the 
legitimate penological goals for juvenile nonhomicide offenders—
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.194 It therefore 
concluded that the sentence for juveniles convicted of a nonhomicide 
offense is “by its nature disproportionate,”195 and is cruel and unusual 
under the Eighth Amendment.196  
                                                                                                                     
 186. See Flynn, supra note 145, at 1054; Roper, 543 U.S. at 569. 
 187. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575. The Court explained that “[c]apital punishment must be limited 
to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose extreme 
culpability makes them the most deserving of execution.” Id. at 568. Roper abrogated Stanford v. 
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1988), which held that the death penalty could be imposed on juvenile 
offenders between the ages of sixteen and seventeen. 
 188. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030. In his article Clemency for Our Children, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2641, 2645 (2011), Professor Anthony C. Thompson argued that the Court in Graham 
missed the fundamental point of its conclusion that juveniles are categorically less culpable than 
adults when it limited its ban on life without parole to those convicted of nonhomicide offenses. 
 189. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027. 
 190. Id. at 2027.  
 191. Id.  
 192. See supra notes 180–83and accompanying text. 
 193. Id.  
 194. Id. at 2028–30. 
 195. Id. at 2028.  
 196. Id. at 2030. 
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Despite Graham’s failure to recognize that constitutional differences 
between juveniles and adults are not isolated to those juveniles who 
commit nonhomicide offenses, it broke Eighth Amendment ground by 
creating the first categorical rule prohibiting a sentence other than death.197 
In addition to establishing that death is different for purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment and sentencing, the Court in Graham soundly established that 
children are different too.  
C.  Miller v. Alabama: Child-Status and the Death of Mandatory Death-
in-Prison Sentences for Children 
Just as Graham extended Eighth Amendment categorical bans beyond 
the context of capital punishment,198 Miller extends Eighth Amendment 
challenges to yet another category of punishment: mandatory sentences 
involving a punishment less than death.199 In ruling that sentences of 
mandatory life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders are 
unconstitutional,200 the Court in Miller recognized that “none of what it 
said [in Graham] about children—about their distinctive (and transitory 
mental) traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime specific.”201 At 
its core, Miller recognizes that denying any child a chance for 
rehabilitation and redemption without consideration of the mitigating 
factors attendant to his or her child status, is fundamentally unfair and is 
likely to result in disproportionate punishment.202  
As noted in Part III.A, to reach its holding, the Miller Court relied on 
two lines of Eighth Amendment precedent.203 First, it relied on Roper and 
Graham, where the Court applied its Eighth Amendment framework for 
categorical bans based on the characteristics of the offender or the nature of 
the offense.204 The Court explained that although Graham’s “flat ban” 
against juvenile life without parole was explicitly confined to nonhomicide 
offenders, the characteristics that make juveniles less culpable than adults 
are “evident in the same way, and to the same degree,” when a juvenile 
commits a homicide offense, and “Graham’s reasoning implicates any life-
without-parole sentence imposed on a juvenile.”205 Miller summarized 
                                                                                                                     
 197. See id. at 2046 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that Graham “eviscerate[d]” the 
distinction that “[d]eath is different,” because until Graham “the Court ha[d] based its categorical 
proportionality rulings on the notion that the Constitution gives special protection to capital 
defendants because the death penalty is a uniquely severe punishment that must be reserved for only 
those who are ‘most notably deserving of execution’”). 
 198. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2046. 
 199. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).  
 200. Id. at 2461. 
 201. Id. at 2465. 
 202. See id. at 2465–69. 
 203. Id. at 2463. 
 204. Id. at 2463–64.  
 205. Id. at 2465. 
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Roper and Graham as having established “that the distinctive attributes of 
youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest 
sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible 
crimes.”206 It concluded that mandatory life without parole for juveniles 
“contravenes Graham’s (and also Roper’s) foundational principle: that 
imposition of a State’s most severe penalties on juvenile offenders cannot 
proceed as though they were not children.”207 
Because Graham likened juvenile parole to a sentence of death, Miller 
also relied on the Court’s Eighth Amendment precedent requiring 
individualized sentencing when imposing capital punishment.208 In 
particular, it emphasized that in those cases the Court “insisted . . .  that a 
sentencer have the ability to consider the ‘mitigating qualities of youth,’” 
including the age, background, and mental and emotional development of 
child offenders.209 The Court summarized the constitutional shortcomings 
of mandatory life without parole: 
[It] precludes consideration of [a child’s] chronological age 
and its hallmark features—among them, immaturity, 
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences. 
It prevents taking into account the family and home 
environment that surrounds [a child]—and from which he 
cannot usually extricate himself—not matter how brutal or 
dysfunctional. It neglects the circumstances of the homicide 
offense, including the extent of his participation in the 
conduct and the way familial and peer pressures may have 
affected him. Indeed, it ignores that he might have been 
charged and convicted of a lesser offense if not for 
incompetencies associated with youth—for example, his 
inability to deal with police officers or prosecutors (including 
on a plea agreement) or his incapacity to assist his own 
attorneys. And finally, this mandatory punishment disregards 
the possibility of rehabilitation even when the circumstances 
most suggest it.210  
Miller mandates that a sentencer “take into account . . . how th[e]se 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing [children] to a lifetime 
                                                                                                                     
 206. Id. at 2465. See also id. at 2467 (discussing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 
(1982), in which the Court invalidated a death sentence for the 16-year-old defendant “because the 
judge did not consider evidence of [the defendant’s] neglectful and violent family 
background . . . and his emotional disturbance”). 
 207. Id. at 2466. 
 208. Id. at 2467.  
 209. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993); Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116).  
 210. Id. at 2468 (citations omitted). 
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in prison.”211 The Court noted that “given all [it has] said in Roper, 
Graham, and [Miller] about children’s diminished culpability and 
heightened capacity for change . . . appropriate occasions for sentencing 
juveniles to the harshest penalty will be uncommon.”212 If life without 
parole should be “uncommon” for child offenders, and resereved only for 
the most culpable of these offenders if it is to be used at all, it follows that 
the sentence should never be imposed on juveniles such as Kuntrell 
Jackson, who are convicted of accessorial felony murder and do not kill or 
intend to kill.  
IV.  PUNISHING JUVENILES FOR ACCESSORIAL FELONY MURDER 
A.  Twice Diminished Culpability 
In drawing a line between homicide and nonhomicide, the Court in 
Graham relied on Eighth Amendment precedent that “defendants who do 
not kill, intend to kill, or foresee that life will be taken are categorically 
less deserving of the most serious forms of punishment than are 
murderers.”213 The Graham majority explained: 
Although an offense like robbery or rape is a “serious crime 
deserving serious punishment,” those crimes differ from 
homicide crimes in a moral sense. It follows that, when 
compared to an adult murderer, a juvenile offender who does 
not kill or intend to kill has a twice diminished moral 
culpability. The age of the offender and the nature of the 
crime each bear on the analysis.214 
Justice Stephen Breyer, in his concurring opinion in Miller joined by 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, argued that “the Eighth Amendment as 
interpreted in Graham forbids sentencing [Kuntrell] Jackson to [life 
without parole], regardless of whether its application is mandatory or 
discretionary under state law.”215 Justice Breyer explained that “given 
Graham’s reasoning, the kinds of homicide that can subject a juvenile 
offender to life without parole must exclude instances where the juvenile 
himself neither kills nor intends to kill the victim,” because “[q]uite 
simply,” he “lacks ‘twice diminished’ responsibility.”216  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 211. Id. at 2469. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (citing Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 
2659–60 (2008); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 
(1987); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)). 
 214. Id. at 2027 (emphasis added) (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797). 
 215. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 216. Id. at 2475–76. 
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Indeed, this language from Graham tracks the Court’s language in 
Enmund v. Florida,217 in which it held that the Eighth Amendment forbids 
capital punishment for a defendant who “aids and abets a felony in the 
course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself 
kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force 
will be employed.”218 In Enmund, the Court concluded that the death 
penalty should be reserved for the most culpable offenders (those who 
intentionally take a human life), and that a defendant convicted of felony 
murder who does not kill or intend to kill does not fall within this 
category.219 By the Court’s own logic, if adults who do not kill or intend to 
kill are not morally deserving of the harshest sentence available to 
adults,220 then it follows that juveniles who do not kill or intend to kill are 
not morally deserving of the harshest sentence available to juveniles.  
 
 
                                                                                                                     
 217. 458 U.S. 782 (1982). The defendant, Earl Enmund, was the driver of the getaway car for a 
robbery in which two people were killed by his accomplice. Id. at 784, 788.  
 218. Id. at 797.  
 219. See Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798, 801. Five years later in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 135, 
158 (1987), the Court allowed the death penalty to be applied to two aiders and abettors who were 
“actively involved in every element of the kidnapping-robbery” underlying their felony murder 
conviction, and showed “reckless indifference to human life” through their participation in this 
crime. The petitioners in Tison were two brothers who brought guns into a prison and armed and 
freed their father and his prison mate, both of whom were previously convicted of murder. Id. at 
139. In the subsequent escape, they assisted their father and his prison mate in flagging down a 
passing car; robbed the passengers; held them at gunpoint while their father decided what to do with 
them; and stood by while their father and his prison mate shot them. Id. at 151–52. One of the 
brothers also admitted that “he was prepared to kill in furtherance of the prison break.” Id. at 152. 
The Court narrowed the rule in Enmund by holding that some accomplices convicted of felony 
murder who do not kill or intend to kill, but who exhibit reckless disregard for human life through 
their active involvement in the underlying felony, may be culpable enough to justify the death 
penalty. In doing so, the Court at best muddied what was a clear rule in Enmund and at worst 
undermined Enmund’s reasoning. However, as Justice Breyer pointed out in Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 
2476, “even juveniles who meet the Tison standard of ‘reckless disregard’” should not be sentenced 
to life without parole because the Court in Graham specifically stated that juveniles “who do not 
kill or intend to kill ha[ve] twice diminished moral culpability.” Graham, 130 S. Ct. at  2027. The 
Court in Graham did not qualify this statement with a reference to the heightened culpability of 
those juveniles who exhibit reckless disregard for human life. See id. Graham therefore “dictates a 
clear rule” prohibiting the imposition of life without parole on these juveniles. See Miller, 132 S. 
Ct. at 2476. 
 220. See Rosen, supra note 43, at 1116–17 (“[T]he possibility always exists that, with the 
felony murder rule as a basis for a capital sentence, some minimally culpable felony murder 
defendants, like accidental killers or attenuated accomplices to the felony, will be sentenced to die, 
even while many cold-blooded premeditated killers will be allowed to live. This possibility hardly 
reflects the proportionality—the reservation of the death penalty for the worst murderers—that 
underlies the Court’s entire eighth amendment venture.”). 
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B.  The Doctrine of Felony Murder 
The fundamental differences between juveniles and adults discussed in 
Roper, Graham, and Miller221 call into question the propriety of ever 
applying the felony-murder rule to juveniles.222 But assuming that states 
continue to prosecute juvenile offenders for felony murder, Graham makes 
clear that the Eighth Amendment forbids sentencing them to life in prison 
without the possibility of parole. 
1.  Homicide Without the Necessary Mental State 
 Felony murder is a form of strict liability at its most extreme. Strict 
liability imposes criminal liability for an action without proof of intent—or 
mens rea—to commit the action.223 The doctrine of felony murder imposes 
liability for murder where a defendant engages in a felonious act or 
attempts to engage in a felonious act and someone dies as a result.224 
Unlike other homicide offenses, there is no independent mens rea 
requirement for accessorial felony murder. Instead, the intent to commit the 
underlying felony satisfies the requisite intent to kill, and a defendant can 
be charged with and convicted of murder even if he did not kill or intend to 
kill the victim.225 This is often referred to as “transferred intent.”226 Felony 
murder therefore ignores the fundamental principle of criminal justice: that 
“a culpable mental state . . . is a necessary component of moral 
blameworthiness, and thus, a requirement for criminal punishment.”227 
                                                                                                                     
 221. See supra Part IV. 
 222. See Flynn, supra note 145, at 1053–54 (arguing that the justification for felony murder 
“runs afoul” of the Court’s conclusions about juveniles’ lessened culpability in Roper, and that 
felony murder charges “should be categorically excluded as applied to juveniles”).  
 223. See Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 416 
(2007). 
 224. Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 763, 763 (1999). The common example of felony murder is Kuntrell Jackson’s case, where the 
underlying felony is robbery during which an accomplice causes the victim’s death. See supra Part 
I. 
 225. See Steven A. Drizin & Allison McGown Keegan, Abolishing the Use of the Felony-
Murder Rule When the Defendant Is a Teenager, 28 NOVA L. REV. 507, 527 (2004); Gerber, supra 
note 224, at 770–71 (“[T]he rule ignores the felon’s true state of mind and, in its place, concocts a 
homicidal mental state from evidence of a felonious mental state less culpable than homicide. [It] 
transfers the intent to commit a felony to the death even if the death is accidental and 
unanticipated.”).  
 226. See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (Breyer, J., concurring); Nelson E. 
Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossraods, 70 
CORNELL L. REV. 446, 453 (1985). 
 227. See Michael L. Seigel, Bringing Coherence to Mens Rea Analysis for Securities-Related 
Offenses, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1563, 1564 (2006). Professor Seigel explains that the drafters of the 
Model Penal Code “cut through [a] legacy of incoherence” surrounding the application of mens rea 
when they established four rules for its application. Id. at 1565. One of these is that “an element of 
mens rea . . .‘attaches’ to each of the . . . material elements of any given crime—the actus reii and 
30
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 Justification for the felony-murder rule rests on theories of deterrence 
and retribution.228 Ultimately, the doctrine promotes the idea that someone 
who decides to partake in a potentially dangerous felony should reasonably 
anticipate any resulting injury and should therefore be held liable when 
such injury in fact occurs.229 Knowledge of accessorial liability and its 
potentially harsh punishment is intended to deter potential offenders by 
compelling them to act with extreme caution in committing the felony or to 
abandon its commission outright.230 The retributive aspect seeks to impose 
greater punishment where greater harm has been caused (death), regardless 
of whether the defendant intended such harm.231 Scholars have suggested 
that this notion of “just deserts” is justified by a normative assumption that 
people who commit felonies have generally deficient characters.232 In other 
words, the decision to engage in criminal acts demonstrates inherent moral 
impairment that renders such offenders culpable for any unintended 
consequences.  
2.  Perversion of the Justifications for Punishment 
“Few legal doctrines have been as maligned and yet have shown as great 
a resiliency as the felony-murder rule. Criticism of the rule constitutes a 
lexicon of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal 
doctrine: it has been described as ‘astonishing’ and ‘monstrous,’ an 
unsupportable ‘legal fiction,’ ‘an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal 
law,’ and as an ‘anachronistic remnant’ that has 'no logical or practical 
basis for existence in modern law.’”233 
Because of its egregious disregard of some of the most basic principles 
of criminal justice, it is an understatement to say that the felony-murder 
rule “is a much-condemned doctrine.”234 Among its most compelling 
                                                                                                                     
attendant circumstances—and the requisite mens rea for each of these elements may in fact be 
different.” Id. Felony murder is a blatant perversion of this rule. It substitutes mens rea that should 
attach to the actus reus of murder with the mens rea that attaches to the actus reus of the underlying 
felony.  
 228. See Flynn, supra note 145, at 1063 (citing JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL 
LAW § 31.06[B], at 516–19 (3d ed. 2001)); see also Kevin Cole, Killings During Crime: Toward a 
Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74–78 (1990). 
 229. See Cole, supra note 228, at 106. 
 230. Flynn, supra note 145, at 1063. See also Cole, supra note 228, at 102.  
 231. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 457–58 .  
 232. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 228, at 99, 101 (“[I]n the felony-murder context, some of our 
normal reluctance to make generalizations based on character are absent.”); Roth & Sundby, supra 
note 226, at 457–58 (explaining that the rule is justified in part by the “evil mind” theory that “one 
who does bad acts cannot complain about being punished for their consequences, no matter how 
unexpected”). 
 233. Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 446. 
 234. See, e.g., Drizin & Keegan, supra note 225, at 528; George P. Fletcher, Reflections on 
Felony Murder, 12 SW. U. L. REV. 413, 427–28 (1981) (arguing that the principle behind felony 
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criticisms are the arguments that both its deterrent and retributive 
justifications fail, and that because it seeks to punish an offender for harm 
he did not intend, it inevitably results in disproportionate punishment.235 
And yet almost every state prosecutes both children and adults for felony 
murder.236  
The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized these criticisms. The 
argument that the deterrent objective of felony murder fails is that 
unintended or unforeseen acts (the resulting death) cannot logically be 
deterred.237 In Enmund, the Court explained that when “a person does not 
intend that life be taken . . . the possibility that the death penalty will be 
imposed for vicarious felony murder will not ‘enter into the cold calculus 
that precedes the decision to act.’”238 The Court in Enmund also noted a 
lack of empirical evidence showing that the felony murder rule in fact 
deters deaths.239 Additionally, critics of the rule argue that “a felony-
murder rule is unnecessary to deter underlying felonies because those 
felonies are deterred simply by increasing punishments for the intentional 
felony offenses.”240  
The retributive justification for felony murder—that punishment should 
be determined in accordance with harm caused rather than harm 
intended—has also been heavily criticized. That justification “fails to 
capture a wrongdoer’s culpability properly,” 241 because culpability should 
be based on an individual defendant’s criminal intent and accompanying 
actions, and not simply on harm caused in the commission of a crime.242 
                                                                                                                     
murder violates “a basic principle of just punishment” since “[p]unishment must be proportional to 
wrongdoing. When the felony-murder rule converts an accidental death into first-degree 
murder . . . punishment is rendered disproportionate to the wrong for which the offender is 
personally responsible.”); Gerber, supra, note 224, at 770 (“The doctrine contradicts our most basic 
conception of proportionality.”); Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 446. 
 235. See supra note 234. 
 236. Flynn, supra note 145, at 1063 (citing DRESSLER, supra note 228 § 31.06[A], at 515 
n.110, and explaining that Dressler notes “that only three states have rejected the [felony-murder] 
rule and that a fourth state has imposed a mens rea requirement for felony-murder convictions”).  
 237. Id. at 1064 (citing DRESSLER, supra note 228 § 31.06[B][2], at 516–17); Roth & Sundby, 
supra note 226, at 451. 
 238. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 799 (1982) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
186 (1976)). For deterrence to have any effect “the penalty must enter into the defendant’s 
contemplation; thus, by definition, deterrence is inapplicable whenever an unintentional killing 
occurs.” Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 485 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 800). 
 239. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799 (“Competent observers have concluded that there is no basis in 
experience for the notion that death so frequently occurs in the course of a felony for which killing 
is not an essential ingredient that the death penalty should be considered as a justifiable deterrent to 
the felony itself.”). 
 240. Flynn, supra note 145, at 1064; Roth & Sundby, supra note 226, at 452. 
 241. See Flynn, supra note 145, at 1065 (citing H.L.A. HART, Intention and Punishment, in 
PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 113, 130–31 (1968)).  
 242. See supra note 227 and accompanying text; Steven F. Shatz, The Eighth Amendment, The 
Death Penalty, and Ordinary Robbery-Burglary Murderers: A California Case Study, 59 FLA. L. 
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Again, the Supreme Court adopted this reasoning in Enmund when it stated 
that “[i]t is fundamental that ‘causing harm intentionally must be punished 
more severely than causing the same harm unintentionally.’”243 To fail to 
distinguish between the intentional murderer and the robber who has no 
murderous intent and takes no murderous action undermines the entire 
thrust of retribution—it renders punishment for both less legitimate by 
making any notion of proportionality moot. 
C.  Cruel and Unusual: Sentencing Juveniles Convicted of Felony 
Murder to Life Without Parole  
“Legal theories and their phrasing in other cases readily lead to fallacious 
reasoning if uncritically transferred to a determination of a State’s duty 
toward children.”244 
The serious theoretical shortcomings of felony murder liability apply 
with exponentially greater force to juveniles.245 Sentencing a juvenile who 
did not kill or intend to kill to life without parole serves neither deterrence 
nor retribution—the “penological goals”246 presumably advanced by 
punishing those guilty of felony murder—and the sentence therefore 
violates the Eighth Amendment.247 As Roper, Graham, and Miller 
implicitly suggest, the rationale underlying felony murder is utterly 
incompatible with our modern understanding of juveniles.248  
Justice Breyer explained in Miller that “the ability to consider the full 
consequences of a course of action and to adjust one’s conduct accordingly 
is precisely what we know juveniles lack capacity to do effectively.”249 
This means that a juvenile is much less likely than an adult to recognize 
that his participation in a robbery or other felony could potentially result in 
                                                                                                                     
REV. 719, 766 (2007) (“With respect to retribution, the Court has made clear that [it] must be 
calibrated to the defendant’s culpability, which in turn depends on his mental state with regard to 
the crime.”). 
 243. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798 (quoting H.L.A. HART, Punishment and the Elimination of 
Responsibility, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 158, 162 (1968)). The Enmund Court explained 
that when using retribution as a justification for imposing the harshest possible penalty, “very much 
depends on the degree of [the defendant’s] culpability,” including his “intentions, expectations, and 
actions.” Id. at 800. 
 244. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting May v. 
Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 536 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 245. Drizin & Keegan, supra note 225, at 531; Flynn, supra note 145, at 1065; Miller v. 
Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Given Graham, [Enmund’s] 
holding applies to juveniles sentences of life without parole a fortiori.”).  
 246. Jackson Petition, supra note 48, at 29 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 
(2010)). 
 247. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028. 
 248. See supra Part IV. 
 249. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2476 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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death or injury.250 Likewise, juveniles’ increased susceptibility to negative 
peer influence “inhibit[s] their ability to withdraw from potentially deadly 
situations when they are encouraged into wrongdoing by others.”251 
Because adolescents “are less likely to foresee the consequences of their 
actions and process the potential effects of their actions on others,” they are 
less likely to be deterred by the specter of even the most severe 
punishment.252 The gravity of a harsh sentence has little significance for 
juveniles before it is imposed, and is a weak deterrent to their reckless 
behavior. This is particularly true for life without parole, a sentence that 
stretches indefinitely into a future children have not yet begun to 
comprehend.253 Case studies show that juvenile offenders do not realize the 
true finality of this sentence until many years after they have been 
committed to prison.254 One individual articulated his understanding of his 
sentence in an interview with Human Rights Watch:  
It was very emotional and I broke out crying in court. I don’t 
know if I fully understood but I kinda understood when they 
just said, “guilty, guilty, guilty” and “life” y’know? As time 
went on, I’m really starting to realize how serious it is. I was 
young, I wasn’t really too educated. When I got locked up, I 
was in the Eighth grade. All my education has come 
through . . . being incarcerated.”255  
For these reasons, the deterrence rationale—which is problematic as it 
applies to adults punished for felony murder—has little plausibility when 
applied to juveniles.   
The retribution rational for felony murder is similarly weakened in the 
case of juveniles. At “[t]he heart of the retribution rationale is that a 
criminal sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the 
criminal offender.”256 As a starting point, the Court established in Roper 
                                                                                                                     
 250. Id. at 29–30 (citing B. LUNA, The Maturation of Cognitive Control and the Adolescent 
Brain, in FROM ATTENTION TO GOAL-DIRECTED BEHAVIOR 249, 252–56 (F. Aboitiz & D. Cosmelli 
eds., 2009)). See also Flynn, supra note 145, at 1055 n.31 (citing Marty Beyer, Immaturity, 
Culpability & Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, CRIM. JUST. Summer 2000, at 26, 27). 
 251. Jackson Petition, supra note 48, at 30 (citing Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026). 
 252. Flynn, supra note 145, at 1055.  
 253. Taylor-Thompson, supra note 82, at 154 (explaining that, “[a]dolescents, more than 
adults, tend to discount the future and to afford greater weight to short-term consequences of 
decisions,” and that “in part because adolescents have had less experience, considering the meaning 
of a consequence that will only be realized ten or more years in the future may prove exceedingly 
difficult.”). 
 254. THE REST OF THEIR LIVES, supra note 13, at 54. 
 255. Id.  
 256. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). As explained in Section IV.B above, the personal culpability of 
a defendant is based on his intent (or state of mind) and his actions in committing a crime. See 
supra notes 223–227 and accompanying text. 
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that “[w]hether viewed as an attempt to express the community’s moral 
outrage or as an attempt to right the balance for the wrong to the victim, 
the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an adult.”257 In 
Graham, the Court explained that “[t]he case becomes even weaker with 
respect to a juvenile who did not commit homicide.”258 Although children 
convicted of accessorial felony murder are technically homicide offenders, 
the Court in Graham clearly stated that as a result of their child status and 
lack of any homicidal intent, those juveniles “who [do] not kill or intend to 
kill [have] a twice diminished moral culpability.”259 Therefore, despite 
their technical conviction for homicide, children convicted of felony 
murder who do not kill or intend to kill can never be among the most 
culpable juvenile (homicide) offenders.260 It follows that they do not 
deserve life imprisonment without parole, the harshest punishment 
available for them.261 Simply put, because juveniles who do not kill or 
intend to kill can never be among the most culpable juvenile offenders, this 
most ultimate condemnation262 is necessarily excessive. Graham therefore 
requires that each of these individuals be given a “meaningful opportunity 
for release,”263 and an “opportunity to achieve maturity of judgment and 
self-recognition of human worth and potential.”264 
None of this reasoning changes whether applied to Terrence Graham or 
Kuntrell Jackson. Both were juveniles when they committed their crimes, 
and neither exhibited the kind of criminal intent that merits the most severe 
punishment. It is starkly incongruent with the logic of Graham to say that 
life without parole is a cruel and unusual sentence for Terrence Graham, 
who himself inflicted violence on his robbery victim but was fortunate 
enough that no one was killed during its commission,265 but is not cruel 
and unusual for Kuntrell Jackson, who inflicted no violence on his robbery 
victim but whose accomplice made the poor choice to pull the trigger.266 
As Justice Breyer concluded, if, upon remand, the trial court finds that 
Kuntrell Jackson did not intend to kill the clerk, then “the Eighth 
Amendment simply forbids imposition of a life term without the possibility 
                                                                                                                     
 257. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 453 U.S. 551, 571 (2005)). 
 258. Id.  
 259. Id. at 2016. 
 260. See id. at 2027. 
 261. See id. at 2028 (“The considerations underlying [Roper’s] holding support as well the 
conclusion that retribution does not justify imposing the second most severe penalty on the less 
culpable juvenile nonhomicide offender.”). 
 262. See id. at 2027. Like death, “the sentence alters the [child’s] life by a forfeiture that is 
irrevocable,” by depriving the child “of the most basic liberties without . . . hope of restoration.” Id. 
 263. Id. at 2033 
 264. Id. at 2032. 
 265. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 266. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
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of parole.”267  
It is unfortunate that only Justices Breyer and Sotomayor in Miller were 
willing to recognize that the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by 
Graham, requires a categorical rule against life without parole for juveniles 
who do not kill or intend to kill.268 Such a rule is the only way to ensure 
that these individuals do not receive this unconstitutional and excessive 
punishment. However, even if the trial court in Kuntrell’s case does not 
find that Graham’s reasoning categorically prohibits resentencing Kuntrell 
to life without parole, a faithful application of Miller should preclude the 
sentence. In conducting invididualized sentencing, lower courts should 
recognize that Kuntrell Jackson and others like him are not among the 
worst juvenile offenders. Courts should accordingly give these individuals 
“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation” when resentencing them.269  
With these considerations in mind, Part V briefly addresses the 
implementation of Miller by lower courts. First, it argues that lower courts 
should follow Miller’s mandate of individualized sentencing by looking to 
Supreme Court precedent on individualized sentencing in the capital 
context. Second, it argues that in doing so, lower courts should recognize 
that juveniles who did not kill or intend to kill cannot be among the most 
culpable juvenile offenders, and should accordingly sentence these 
individuals to something less than life without parole.  
V.  ATONING FOR OUR SINS AND THEIRS—GIVING OUR CHILDREN A 
SECOND CHANCE WITH MILLER V. ALABAMA  
“Then came Peter to him, and said, Lord, how oft shall my brother sin 
against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Jesus saith unto him, I say 
not unto thee, Until seven times: but, Until seventy times seven.”“Then 
Peter came up and said to him, ‘Lord, how often shall my brother sin 
against me, and I forgive him? As many as seven times?’ Jesus said to him, 
‘I do not say to you seven times, but seventy times seven.’”270 
Going forward, Miller provides a chance at resentencing for the roughly 
2,000 individuals who were mandatorily sentenced to life without parole as 
juveniles.271 It also requires individualized sentencing for juvenile 
                                                                                                                     
 267. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2477 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 268. Id. at 2475–76. 
 269. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2016. 
 270. Matthew 18:21 (King James).http://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Matthew+ 
18%3A21-22&version=ESV. 
 271. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). The Court in Miller 
retroactively applied its holding to Kuntrell Jackson’s case, which was on collateral review at the 
time, see id. at 2461, and remanded it for resentencing. Id. at 2475. This suggests that the Supreme 
Court fully intended for Miller to apply retroactively to and require resentencing in all cases in 
which a juvenile was mandatorily sentenced to life without parole. Still, the Court failed to clarify 
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offenders currently facing imposition of that “harshest possible penalty for 
juveniles.”272 In all of these cases, courts must ensure that the sentencer 
(whether it be the judge or the jury) “take into account how children are 
different”273 and “have the opportunity to consider [any other] mitigating 
circumstances before imposing the harshest possible penalty for 
juveniles.”274 
This is no small task. The Court in Miller did not prescribe how states 
should implement this individualized sentencing. However, because 
Miller’s rule is based on Eighth Amendment precedent requiring 
individualized sentencing in the context of capital punishment,275 it follows 
that lower courts (and practitioners) should look to these cases to 
determine what constitutes mitigation, and how it should be presented and 
considered at the trial level.  
First, courts will ultimately need to conduct new sentencing hearings to 
allow the sentencer to properly consider any mitigating qualities of youth 
or of the circumstances of the offense.276 The opportunity to present 
mitigating evidence in the capital context is meant to ensure that “the death 
penalty is reserved only for the most culpable defendants committing the 
most serious offenses.”277 Similarly, the opportunity to present mitigation 
for juveniles facing life without parole is to ensure that only the most 
culpable juvenile offender—or “the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
reflects irreperable corruption”—may receive this most severe sentence.278 
To this end, Miller requires the sentencer “to take into account how 
children are different, and how those differences counsel against 
irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”279  
                                                                                                                     
this directly, and lower courts are now split on the issue. For example, in People v. Williams, 2012 
IL App 1st 111145 at *13–14, the First District Appellate Court of Illinois applied the standards for 
retroactivity established by the Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and as 
interpreted by the Illinois Supreme Court, and held that Miller should be applied retroactively 
because “it is a rule that requires the observance of those procedures that are implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Alternatively, in an unpublished opinion, the 
Third District Court of Appeal in Florida applied the Florida Supreme Court’s test for retroactivity 
and held that Miller is not retroactive because it is a procedural change in the law and does not 
“constitute a development of fundamental significance.” Geter v. State, No. 3D12–76, 2012 WL 
4448860, at *3 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2012).  
 272. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475. It is worth noting that the Court did not explicitly refer to “life 
without parole” in its final holding. This ostensibly leaves open to principled attack other 
mandatory sentences for juveniles. 
 273. Id. at 2469. 
 274. Id. at 2475. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. at 2467–68. Such a sentencing hearing would not be unlike the penalty phase in 
the bifurcated trial of a capital case, which was first required  by the Supreme Court in Gregg v. 
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189–92 (1976). 
 277. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467. 
 278. Id. at 2469. 
 279. Id.  
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At a minimum, the mitigating evidence that a sentencer must consider 
under Miller includes an offender’s age at the time of the offense; the 
extent of the offender’s participation in the offense and “the way familial 
and peer pressures may have affected” this participation; the offender’s 
“mental and emotional development”; the offender’s background, 
including “family and home environment” and any abuse or trauma or 
exposure to violence; and any evidence of the offender’s capacity for 
change and rehabilitation.280 This list of mitigating factors in Miller is not 
necessarily exhaustive, however. The Supreme Court has explained that an 
individualized sentencing determination requires “a broad inquiry into all 
relevant mitigating evidence,”281 and that “virtually no limits are placed” 
on what this includes.282 As an example, extrapolating from precedent in 
the capital context suggests that evidence of a juvenile offender’s capacity 
to change may include his or her post-offense behavior.283  
As to the presentation of mitigating evidence, the defense should be 
prepared to put on, and trial courts should be prepared to hear, mitigation 
experts at the sentencing hearings. An effective mitigation defense requires 
the skillful collection and presentation of sensitive personal information 
about a defendant’s background—skills in which most lawyers are not 
well-versed—and as such, competent representation will most often 
require a mitigation expert or specialist.284 Additionally, trial courts should 
conduct these sentencing hearings with the understanding that “full 
consideration” of evidence that mitigates against life without parole should 
be considered by the sentencing body so that it may “give a reasoned moral 
response to the defendant’s background, character, and crime.”285 This 
means that trial courts conducting sentencing hearings under Miller should 
ensure that the sentencer “have the ability to consider the mitigating 
qualities of youth” and other circumstances of the offense so that the 
sentencer may legitimately extend mercy to all but the most culpable 
juvenile offenders.286  
                                                                                                                     
 280. See id.  
 281. Buchanon v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276 (1998). 
 282. Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 
822 (1991) (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982))). 
 283. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1,  4 (1986) (holding that post-offense evidence 
of the defendant’s good behavior during seventh months in jail awaiting trial constituted relevant 
mitigating evidence). 
 284. See Russell Stetler, The Mystery of Mitigation: What Jurors Need to Make a Reasoned 
Moral Response in Capital Sentencing, 11 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 237, pt. IV (2008). 
 285. See id. at 243–44 (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989), in which the 
Court “reaffirm[ed] the principle that punishment should be directly related to the personal 
culpability of the criminal defendant in capital cases”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stetler, a 
renowned mitigation practitioner and scholar, explains that the jury’s fact-finding responsibility in 
the sentencing phase of capital trials is a “moral” one “based on an ethic of caring, compassion, and 
mercy.” Id. 
 286. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012).  
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Ultimately, when weighing mitigating evidence at sentencing, the 
sentencer should begin with an understanding that “given all [the Supreme 
Court] ha[s] said in Roper, Graham, and [Miller] about children’s 
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change…appropriate 
occasions for sentencing juveniles to [life without parole] will be 
uncommon.”287 In Miller the Court explained that one of the reasons this 
sentence should be rare “is…because of the great difficulty” in 
distinguishing between those juvenile offenders who are incorrigible—or 
“whose crime reflects irreperable corruption”—and those who are not.288 It 
cautioned that considering what we know about youthful offenders’ great 
capacity for transformation, a sentencer should refrain from making this 
judgment in the majority of cases.289 Moreover, a sentencer should 
recognize that this is particularly true in the case of many individuals 
serving juvenile life without parole because their childhoods were replete 
with trauma. The Sentencing Project’s recent national survey on juveniles 
sentenced to life without parole illustrates this point: it provides empirical 
evidence that many of these individuals had “childhoods…marked by 
frequent exposure to domestic and community-level violence, problems in 
school, engagement with delinquent peers, and familial incarceration.”290 
Significantly, a staggering 79% of them witnessed violence in their own 
homes before committing their crimes.291 Under Miller, this kind of 
dysfunctional upbringing bears directly on a sentencer’s determination of 
an offender’s culpability in committing his offense.292 For all of these 
reasons, lower courts and juries properly resentencing individuals under 
Miller should provide a second chance for many of them outside the walls 
of adult prison.  
Nowhere is this more clear than in the case of individuals like Kuntrell 
Jackson. Regardless of other possible mitigating circumstances such as a 
troubled childhood, those juveniles convicted of homicide offenses who 
did not kill or intend to kill have not shown “irreparable corruption” 293 and 
are not among the most culpable juvenile homicide offenders.294 Graham 
made clear that a juvenile who lacks homicidal intent has “twice 
diminished moral culpability.”295 So even without the benefit of a 
categorical rule—which would properly ensure that no juvenile offender 
who did not kill or intend to kill is unconstitutionally sentenced to life 
without parole—courts resentencing individuals like Kuntrell Jackson 
                                                                                                                     
 287. Id.  
 288. Id. at 2469. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS, supra note 14, at 8. 
 291. Id. at 10. 
 292. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468.  
 293. See id.  
 294. See supra Section IV.C. 
 295. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). 
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should give them some meaningful opportunity for release.296  
The Miller Court’s discussion of how the mitigating circumstances 
surrounding Kuntrell Jackson’s case should bear on his culpability provide 
an illustration of this point.297 The Court referred to the circumstances of 
his case as those that “most suggest” a possibility for rehabilitation.298 It 
noted that Kuntrell did not himself kill the clerk; the state did not argue 
that he intended her to die; and the appellate court affirmed the verdict 
rejecting Kuntrell’s affirmative defense only because the jury could have 
believed that he warned the clerk that “we ain’t playin’,” rather than told 
his codefendants that “I thought you all was playin’.”299 The Court also 
explained that although Kuntrell learned that his codefendant Shields had a 
gun on the way to rob the video store, “his age could well have affected his 
calculation of the risk that posed, as well as his willingness to walk away at 
that point.”300 In addition, the Court clarified that Kuntrell’s “family 
background and immersion in violence”—in particular the fact that “both 
his mother and grandmother had previously shot other individuals”—bear 
on “[his] culpability for the offense.”301 
To be clear: not all of the mitigating circumstances that apply to 
Kuntrell are necessary for finding that life without parole is an excessive 
punishment for a juvenile who does not kill or intend to kill.302 For 
example, suppose a juvenile in Kuntrell’s position knew that his 
accomplice was carrying a gun, or was present for the entire robbery. Or 
suppose instead that this hypothetical juvenile participated in the robbery 
to the same extent that Kuntrell did, but did not have his troubled 
background. A sentencer would likely find such an individual to be more 
culpable than Kuntrell Jackson, and accordingly sentence him to a longer 
term of years. Such a determination would be appropriate. But a sentencer 
would not be justified in making the determination that this individual is 
among the most culpable juvenile homicide offenders, because of the 
                                                                                                                     
 296. Some lower courts have already taken this course. In Rocker v. State, No. 2D10–5060, 
2012 WL 5499975, at *2, 4 (Fla. 2nd Dist. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2012), the Second District Court of 
Appeal in Florida applied Miller and reversed the sentence of life without parole for Corey Rocker, 
who was convicted of felony murder after his accomplice shot the victim of an attempted robbery. 
In remanding to the trial court for resentencing, the court noted that “based on the reasoning in 
Miller, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole would not be appropriate in this case 
where there was no evidence that Rocker was the person who shot the victim or that he intended 
that the victim be killed.” Id. at *4. See also Walling v. State, No. 1D11–4434, 2013 WL 335929, at 
*1, 3 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2013) (reversing the defendant’s mandatory sentence of life 
without parole for felony murder where the defendant did not kill the victim but helped plan the 
robbery and secure the gun, and remanding for resentencing in accordance with Miller).  
 297. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468–69. 
 298. Id. at 2468. 
 299. Id. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  
 300. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2468. 
 301. Id.  
 302. See supra Section IV.C. 
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simple fact that the offender did not himself kill or intend to kill.303 Under 
Miller, sentencing courts—including Kuntrell’s—should give these 
children a chance to transform and redeem themselves, and a meaningful 
opportunity to one day create a life outside of prison.304 
CONCLUSION 
Over 2,500 individuals have been condemned to occupy the cold walls 
of adult prisons for crimes they committed as children, and to remain there 
until they die.305 Many of these children committed acts that deserve 
significant punishment. However, “[l]ife without parole is an especially 
harsh punishment for a juvenile.”306 It is indisputable that “[u]nder this 
sentence a juvenile . . . will on average serve more years and a greater 
percentage of his life in prison than an adult. . . .”307 This most ultimate 
condemnation “gives no chance for fulfillment outside prison walls, no 
chance for reconciliation with society,” and ultimately “no hope” for child 
offenders. And yet we know that even children who commit terrible crimes 
have the capacity to transform and redeem themselves in profound ways.308 
Turning our backs on these children is a shameful departure from the 
rehabilitative ideals that informed the creation of a separate juvenile 
system,309 and from basic precepts of humanity, mercy, and compassion.  
Kuntrell Jackson’s story highlights the extreme consequences that have 
resulted from adjudicating and sentencing children as if they are adults. In 
Roper, Graham, and now Miller, the Supreme Court has recognized that 
the Eighth Amendment limits  the adult punishment of juvenile offenders 
in significant ways because of their “diminished culpability and heightened 
capacity for change.”310  While the Court stopped short in Miller when it 
declined to extend Graham’s categorical rule against life without parole to 
juveniles who do not kill or intend to kill, Miller does provide the 
possibility of a second chance for at least 2,000 of the individuals serving 
this sentence.311 Most significantly, a sentencer must now consider all of 
the mitigating qualities of youth in deciding whether to impose that 
“harshest possible penalty” on a juvenile.312 The Court in Miller suggested 
that this should preclude the vast majority of children from being 
                                                                                                                     
 303. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2027 (2010). 
 304. See supra notes 263–64and accompanying text. 
 305. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 306. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010). 
 307. Id. (explaining that “a 16-year-old and a 75-year-old each sentenced to life without parole 
receive the same punishment in name only). 
 308. See supra notes 149–52 and accompanying text.   
 309. See supra Section II.A. 
 310. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012). 
 311. Id. at 2477 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 312. Id. at 2469 (majority opinion). 
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condemned to die in prison, regardless of their crime.313 It also suggested 
that children like Kuntrell Jackson, who do not kill or intend to kill, are not 
deserving of this sentence. Lower courts should, and hopefully will, 
recognize this as well. 
                                                                                                                     
 313. See id. (“But given all we have said in Roper, Graham, and this decision about children’s 
diminished culpability and heightened capacity for change, we think appropriate occasions for 
sentencing juveniles to this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon.”). 
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